Evaluating and preventing the tsunami risk for France's metropolitan and overseas coasts

SENAT

Report n° 117 (2007-2008) by M. Roland COURTEAU, Senator (for the parliament office for the evaluation of scientific and technological choices) - Appendix to the minutes of the 7 December 2007 session

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• INTRODUCTION
  
  • I. WHAT IS A TSUNAMI?
    
    • A. A NATURAL HAZARD
      
      • 1. A phenomenon of geological origin
        
        • a) The different causes
          
          • (1) Underwater earthquakes
            
          • (2) Landslides
            
          • (3) Volcanic explosions
            
        • b) A description of the tsunami phenomenon
          
        • c) Various manifestations
          
      • 2. A natural phenomenon of unequal geographical distribution
        
        • a) A greater frequency in the Pacific
          
        • b) No ocean basin is safe from tsunamis
          
    • B. THE TSUNAMI RISK
      
      • 1. The risk factors
        
        • a) The hazard
          
        • b) The stakes
          
        • c) Vulnerability
          
      • 2. Managing risk
        
        • a) A better understanding of the hazard
          
        • b) The role of operational warning systems
          
  • II. A MANAGEMENT OF THE TSUNAMI RISK WHICH VARIES DEPENDING ON THE BASINS
    
    • A. A RISK TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION FOR THE PAST SEVERAL DECADES IN THE PACIFIC
      
      • 1. The existence of an international tsunami-warning system...
        
        • a) History
          
        • b) The current situation
          
          • (1) The role of the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC)
            
          • (2) The actions of the International Tsunami Information Centre (ITIC)
            
      • 2. ... that relies on effective national systems
        
        • a) The American model
          
          • (1) Two warning centres
            
          • (2) A national plan to limit the impact of tsunamis
            
          • (3) A permanent prevention policy
            
        • b) The Japanese model
          
          • (1) A system especially well-suited to local tsunamis
            
          • (2) A well-prepared population
            
          • (3) Considerable means dedicated to constructing protective structures and improving the warning system
            
        • c) The French model in Polynesia
          
          • (1) CEA at the heart of the Polynesian warning system
            
          • (2) A warning system based on a deep understanding of tsunamis
            
          • (3) A warning system best suited to the characteristics of French Polynesia
            
    • B. A RISK THAT BEGAN TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY IN THE OTHER BASINS FOLLOWING THE TSUNAMI OF 26 DECEMBER 2004
      
      • 1. The "shock" of Sumatra
        
        • a) The realization that all basins are vulnerable
          
        • b) Shedding light on the shortcomings of the tsunami-risk prevention system
          
      • 2. The desire for an effective tsunami warning and mitigation system that covers all basins
        
        • a) The creation of three new intergovernmental groups
          
        • b) A strong increase in funding for tsunami-related research
          
      • 3. Unequal results
        
        • a) The Indian Ocean: a successful international mobilization effort
          
        • b) The Caribbean: numerous obstacles to setting up an effective warning system
          
        • c) The waiting game in the Northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean zones
          
  • III. FRANCE'S POSITION: A WAIT-AND-SEE POLICY THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE CONSIDERING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE STAKES
    
    • A. A HIGH VULNERABILITY TO TSUNAMIS WHICH SHOULD INDUCE FRANCE TO MAKE A STRONG COMMITMENT
      
      • 1. Important security stakes
        
        • a) A particularly high vulnerability due to its geography
          
      • 2. Significant advantages
        
        • a) The precedent in Polynesia
          
        • b) Leading organizations in the geosciences and oceanography fields
          
      • 3. A strong mobilization following the Sumatra tsunami
        
        • a) The creation of a Post-Tsunami Interministerial Delegation
          
        • b) The commitment of the Ministry of Ecology
          
          • (1) The creation of a tsunami database
            
          • (2) A study on the vulnerability of the French coasts
            
          • (3) Setting up a warning system
            
          • (4) Educating the public and raising awareness
            
        • c) At the local level, a real raising of public awareness of the tsunami risks
          
        • d) The launch of a warning system in New Caledonia and in Wallis and Futuna
          
    • B. A MOVEMENT THAT IS RUNNING OUT OF STEAM, DUE TO THE LACK OF A STRATEGIC VISION AND INSUFFICIENT FUNDING
      
      • 1. The observed hurdles
        
        • a) In the Indian Ocean
          
        • b) In the Caribbean
          
        • c) In the Mediterranean
          
        • d) In the Pacific
          
      • 2. The reasons for these blocks
        
        • a) The absence of a global vision
          
        • b) The absence of funding
          
      • 3. A change in French policy?
        
  • IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: FOR A STRATEGIC VISION OF TSUNAMI-RISK MANAGEMENT
    
    • A. SIGNIFICANT STAKES
      
      • 1. The security stakes
        
      • 2. The economic stakes
        
      • 3. The geostrategic stakes
        
      • 4. The scientific stakes
        
    • B. THE RECOMMENDATIONS
      
      • 1. Two introductory remarks
        
      • 2. The structural recommendations
        
        • a) Defining a coherent warning system
          
          • (1) Naming a general coordinator
            
          • (2) Using appropriate measuring devices
            
          • (3) Relying on a thorough understanding of the hazard
            
          • (4) Responding appropriately to the hazard
            
          • (5) Raising public awareness
            
        • b) Establishing a long-term, perennial budget
          
        • c) Integration of the tsunami risk into a multi-risk approach?
          
        • d) Voluntary experiments with the management of local-tsunami warnings
          
      • 3. Basin-specific proposals
        
        • a) In the Mediterranean/northeast Atlantic
          
        • b) In the Caribbean
          
        • c) In the Indian Ocean
          
        • d) In the Pacific
          
• SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS
  
• CONCLUSION
  
• APPENDICES
  
  
• APPENDIX 2 -
  LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED