SENAT
Report n° 117 (2007-2008) by M. Roland COURTEAU, Senator (for the parliament office for the evaluation of scientific and technological choices) - Appendix to the minutes of the 7 December 2007 session
Disponible au format Acrobat (21 Moctets)
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: FOR A STRATEGIC VISION OF TSUNAMI-RISK MANAGEMENT
A. SIGNIFICANT STAKES
While the main objective of setting up a tsunami warning system is to protect the coastal populations, France's participation is also to be explained by the existence of other important economic, geostrategic and scientific stakes.
1. The security stakes
These stakes have already been discussed above; therefore, your rapporteur would here simply like to point out that while France takes great pride in its 10-million-km² exclusive economic zone, divided between all of the world's oceans, this territorial scattering also underlines its vulnerability to tsunamis. Therefore, at the international level, the setting up of tsunami warning systems constitutes a fortuitous opportunity for France, because it allows it to ensure the effectiveness of the system by multiplying the amount of seismic and sea-level data available to the concerned countries and to mutualize the investments in measuring devices.
However, considering the national security stakes at hand, it is in France's best interest to play a central role within the intergovernmental coordination groups, so that the warning systems are quickly made operational and adapted to its security needs.
What's more, France has no choice but to define at the national level the most adequate warning-system structure for the effective, affordable protection of its entire coastline. If, as your rapporteur hopes, France were to create a tsunami warning centre for the Mediterranean, this centre would also have to be put in charge of monitoring France's coasts in the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean.
2. The economic stakes
The economic stakes must not be underestimated, either: tourism constitutes an essential resource for our country. If it were later to be revealed that the effects of a devastating tsunami could have been limited by the existence of an operational warning system, this would have a catastrophic impact on our coasts' reputation.
In this regard, your rapporteur is convinced that risk aversion in the developed countries will only increase - in particular, due to their trust in science to protect them from natural disasters. Therefore, we must stop believing that by raising public awareness of natural risks, we thereby hinder economic development; we should instead steer the discussion towards a more general and positive context of natural hazard-prevention policies.
Under the influence of the media, ever avid for powerful images and prompt to point fingers, public authorities will come under increasing social pressure to develop an effective risk-prevention policy.
3. The geostrategic stakes
International coordination is essential for the successful establishment of a tsunami warning system. Indeed, quickly and reliably locating and assessing an earthquake and verifying the generation of a tsunami necessitate both 1) the installation of a large number of measuring devices, not only on French territory, but also in the neighbouring countries and earthquake-prone zones and 2) the availability and sharing of seismic and sea-level data.
Therefore, France's more or less marked involvement in setting up an operational warning system necessarily affects its international influence and relations with the other countries.
During your rapporteur's visits to the West Indies and French Polynesia, he became aware of the strategic (yet largely unknown in metropolitan France) role played by France's overseas territories and départements in the country's relations with the other countries present in these zones.
For example, the ICG/Caribbean-TWS brings together not only the United States (concerned by the tsunami risk in Florida) and the Caribbean countries, but also those countries of South and Central America touching the Atlantic Ocean or the Caribbean Sea.
Likewise, via the ICG/Pacific, France is in permanent contact with Japan, the United States, Australia and those South and Central American countries with a Pacific shoreline.
However, numerous countries would like to cooperate more closely with France.
In the Pacific, France (essentially through LDG/Pamatai and its civil-protection services) works in close collaboration with Australia to develop a tsunami warning system in the southwest Pacific. It has also established excellent ties with Chile, which was the first country to equip its warning centre with a TREMORS system. Because it was able to set up an effective tsunami warning system in French Polynesia, the neighbouring islands, as well as the International Tsunami Information Centre in Hawaii often ask France for help in setting up similar systems and to participate in international conferences.
However, due to a lack of sufficient funding, French cooperation remains limited and sporadic.
In the Caribbean zone, France could make use of the tensions that exist between the United States and Venezuela to strengthen its influence in the region by playing the role of mediator and acting as a counterweight to the United States. Indeed, with the exception of the US, most member states of the ICG/Caribbean-TWS do not have the funds necessary to effectively contribute to the setting up of a warning system. If France were to commit to becoming a regional warning centre alongside that of Puerto Rico, it would considerably strengthen its influence in this zone.
Furthermore, the setting up of a warning system in the Mediterranean necessitates close cooperation between not only the European Union countries, but also the countries of the Mediterranean basin. The French presidency of the European Union starting in July 2008, as well as France's special ties with the North African countries should push our country to play a major role.
Your rapporteur insists on emphasizing the fact that up until now, France has based its position on an erroneous calculation: namely, that by not becoming involved in setting up the warning systems, it would avoid having to help finance them. In reality, France will nevertheless be forced to contribute to funding these systems, without being able to take advantage of them. However, the above examples demonstrate the extent to which France's active participation could constitute an important diplomatic tool.