II. AVOIDING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Iran is more alarming than ever. The unstable, war-mongering, paranoid, Iranian regime showed its true colors after the obviously rigged presidential elections: an oppressive, theocratic, liberticidal dictatorship. If Iran manages to develop nuclear weapons it will be a nightmare for many nations, and not just Western ones.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad crushed the protests over his re-election, but that does not mean his term will be easy. He must confront much more than the supreme guide's symbolic rebuff: the restlessness of his conservative allies, who criticize his arrogance and scorn for institutions 39 ( * ) . They did not appreciate the liberties he took with the law and parliament during his first term. The harshest criticism came when Ahmadinejad refused to obey the supreme guide and dismiss Rahim Mashai, whom he had appointed vice-president. During the investiture of his government by parliament, the deputies rejected the appointment of three candidates Ahmadinejad proposed, including two women and one of his personal friends, Mohammad Ali-Abadi. The president's haughty attitude towards the clergy is at the root of the conservatives' anger. Ahmadinejad deeply annoys the clergy, who have been accustomed to having a big share of power since the 1979 Revolution. He has appointed close associates--usually former Revolutionary Guards--to key posts in the interior and oil ministries and the intelligence services. Many conservatives wonder whether his policies will compromise the Islamic Republic's future.
Ahmadinejad appears to be increasingly alone in the face of criticism from some conservatives, parliament, the judicial branch of government, the Discernment Council (an arbitral institution chaired by Rafsandjani) and even his own allies, who have been pushed into the arms of the opposition one after another. It seems his only solution will be to rely even more on Ayatollah Khamenei, but he is starting to distance himself from the president, in particular by saying on August 26 that there was no proof of any supposed ties between Ahmadinejad's political rivals and certain foreign countries. In another sign, as soon as Ahmadinejad dismissed intelligence minister Qolam Hussein Mohseni Ejei on July 25, the head of the judicial system, who was himself appointed by the Supreme Guide, named him general prosecutor.
The Islamic Republic has always had several centers of power, but never to this extent. It is unclear whether Ahmadinejad will be in a position to conduct national and international policies that would impose further sacrifices on the Iranian people. That is why it is necessary to understand his foreign policy and nuclear program's stage of development before considering what line to take. An analysis based on a historical perspective can help 40 ( * ) .
A. IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: BETWEEN REVOLUTION AND NATIONALISM
According to Iran's constitution the Supreme Guide is the guide of the «Islamic» Revolution, not the «Iranian» Revolution. Iran's critics see that as a desire to export its revolution throughout the Middle East to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon with Hezbollah, Palestine with Hamas and even the remotest parts of Yemen, where the government is said to be aiding the Houti rebellion.
Ahmadinejad's belligerent speeches, saber-rattling attitude and hotheaded outbursts should be taken seriously. There are reasons to consider Iran alarming. True, it has reasons to distrust foreign powers, from the Anglo-American coup that ousted Mossadegh to the UN Security Council's refusal to condemn the Iraqi invasion, which Western countries and all the Arab governments supported. Those memories undoubtedly fuel Iran's prickly nationalism.
Iran's foreign policy has wavered between nationalism and spreading the Revolution.
1. «Islamic» foreign policy and its failure: 1979-1989
a) Policy early in the Revolution
The Islamic Republic of Iran's founding act was the occupation of the US embassy in Teheran in late 1979 and the breaking of diplomatic ties with Washington in April 1980. That radical event defined its foreign policy, which is based on three parts.
First, Iran's desire to display solidarity with all the world's Muslims led the regime to gloss over its Shiite specificity. The goal of its pan-Islamic policy was to rebuild the community of believers ( umma ) around Iran, the rallying point for the Muslim peoples' struggle against the West and Israel.
Iran's foreign policy also had a Third World dimension , which was probably based on Ali Shariati's vision of an «Islamic liberation theology» according to which the world was divided into two camps: the have-nots ( mostazafin ), which included Muslims, and the imperialist oppressors ( mostakberin ). That led Iran to support Cuba and Sandinista Nicaragua while opposing Afghanistan's reactionary Sunni mujahideen.
The third element was virulent anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism prolonging the struggle against the United States' ally, the Shah. Not only did the United States help to bring down Mossadegh, but it also gave Reza Shah massive economic and, especially, military aid. Anti-Zionism served the ambitions of Iran's leaders, who wanted to appear as the Muslim world's leaders. Tensions with the Western powers, in particular the United States, helped maintain a revolutionary climate and strengthen the regime's legitimacy. Internal political struggles have influenced Iran's foreign policy from the start, according to Thierry Coville 41 ( * ) .
The Council of the Islamic Revolution was set up to coordinate and ideologically and financially support Islamic or national movements fighting against the Western powers or «corrupt» Muslim governments. In 1981 Iranian-backed Shiite groups staged an attempted uprising in Bahrain. Several terrorist attacks rocked Kuwait. Iranian agents and Saudi police forces clashed during pilgrimages to Mecca. The Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution led by the hodjatoleslam Muhammad Bakir al-Hakim organized several attacks against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Iran also aided the PLO, Hamas and anti-Russian Shiite resistance groups in Afghanistan.
Iran's most determined action was in Lebanon. In 1982 Hossein Mussavi, the former head of Amal, a Lebanese Shiite formation created in the 1970s, allied with Iran and founded the Islamic Amal Movement, better known as Islamic Jihad. The same year saw the emergence of Hezbollah led by Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadhlallah, who founded Iraq's Shiite party Daawa. The two movements were behind many actions against Western interests in Lebanon, in particular the 1983 US Embassy bombing in Beirut and two suicide attacks on French and US forces based in Lebanon that left 58 and 239 people dead, respectively. When Western troops left Lebanon, Amal and Hezbollah started taking Western hostages.
France was specially targeted because of it was present in Lebanon, supported Iraq and granted asylum to many Iranian dissidents, including the People's Mujahideen. In 1985 Islamic Jihad kidnapped sociologist Michel Seurat, who died in captivity. In 1986 several bombs exploded in Paris. The French police sought to question Iranian translator Wahid Gorji, who had diplomatic status, setting off an «embassy war».
Hezbollah gradually became a major player in Lebanon. From 1985 to 1987 its growing influence led to armed clashes with the country's other Shiite movement, Amal, which was alarmed at seeing its influence dwindle. Hezbollah's emergence and rise was the greatest success of Iran's policy of exporting the Revolution but failed to mask its overall failure.
b) The failure to export the Revolution
Iran did not succeed in bringing about Islamic republics anywhere, not even Lebanon, and never became the leader of a revolutionary movement outside its borders. On the contrary, many Islamic countries and movements, especially if they were Sunni, turned away from Iran, alarmed at its subversive activities.
The war with Iraq was a major factor in that failure because the Iranian regime glorified nationalistic values after Saddam Hussein's attack. A whole generation of militants received military and ideological training. The cult of martyrdom, patterned after Imam Hossieyn's tragic fate, became a key part of official ideology, accentuating Iran's Shiite identity compared to its Sunni neighbors.
Moreover, Iran always cared about defending its national interests and did not hesitate to occasionally make deals with the United States and even Israel, as the events leading up to the Irangate scandal proved in 1986. Despite its proclaimed desire to gather all Muslims together in a global liberation struggle, Teheran did not blink an eye when Syria massacred thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members during clashes in Hamat in 1982. And Iran did nothing to keep Saddam Hussein from slaughtering Shiites during the Gulf War.
Each time, Iran looked out for its own interests, discouraging Sunni movements from supporting Teheran's Muslim internationalist discourse. Iran's only Sunni ally is Syria, but the alliance has no ideological content. The Syrian regime backed Iran against Iraq because Saddam Hussein had always been its sworn enemy and the Iranian alliance facilities its control over Lebanon. It is no surprise, then, that Iran proved incapable of creating and leading a revolutionary Islamic movement in the Middle East and, on the contrary, found itself isolated on the international scene. The most striking example of its failure was the Muslim world's silence during the Iran-Iraq War. Despite support from Iran the PLO eventually sided with Saddam Hussein, which Teheran never forgave.
Even Shiites have not always been loyal to Iran. For example, in the 1980s Hezbollah's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Fadlallah, expressed reservations about the idea of velayat-e faqih 42 ( * ) and acknowledged the impossibility of imposing an Islamic regime on a multiconfessional State such as Lebanon.
2. The return to nationalism and a regional power policy, 1989-2001
The failure of the policy of exporting the Revolution, whose only result was to isolate Iran, combined with the cost of the long war with Iraq, led Iran's leaders to focus on consolidating the regime and meeting the population's material aspirations.
The presidencies of the most moderate ayatollahs, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsandjani (1989-1997) and Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), were marked by pragmatic foreign policies tending to strengthen Iran's regional role.
After the USSR collapsed Iran tried to forge close ties with Central Asia's new republics devoid of any Islamic connotation.
During the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and clashes between Tajikistan's government and the country's Islamic movement, Iran sought to promote understanding and cooperation instead of stoking the flames of Islamic revolution.
Teheran has focused on defending its economic and strategic interests with post-communist Russia: purchase of Russian arms, construction of the Bushehr power plant and building an oil pipeline through the Caspian Sea area.
The fact that Turkey is a Sunni country, allied with the United States, close to Israel and attached to the secular institutions set up by Kemal Ataturk has not kept it from maintaining close ties with Iran, especially since both governments show the same determination in opposing Kurdistan's independence movements. The same pragmatism has prevailed in Iran's relations with the oil-producing Gulf States and, after an initial period of tension, Saudi Arabia. However, its relations with the United Arab Emirates remain marred by the dispute over the Tomb and Abu Moussa Islands, which Teheran occupied during the time of Shah and which the Islamic Republic has never handed over.
During that period Iran tried to normalize its relations with Iraq, exchanging prisoners and developing trade in violation of UN sanctions. Iraq exported more oil and imported more goods than it was allowed to.
Iran's extremely cautious attitude towards Europe during the 1991 Gulf War (condemnation of the coalition's offensive but no interference with the military operations) led to the lifting of economic sanctions and the start of a critical dialogue between the West and Iran that had several goals, including respect for human rights, renunciation of terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and repeal of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie. The dialogue nurtured the growth of economic relations between Europe and Iran. Total, associated with Russia's Gazprom and Malaysia's Petronas, has invested several billion dollars in Iran's oil and gas industry despite the US embargo.
Relations with the United States have not improved since the Revolution even though Iran had definitively abandoned the use of terrorism by the late 1980s and dismantled most of its terrorist networks in 1989 when the pasdarans in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley went to Sudan. What's more, President Rafsandjani encouraged Hezbollah's metamorphosis into a political organization. That orientation did not keep Iran from assassinating several opponents abroad, including Shapur Bakhtiar, the Shah's last prime minister, in Suresnes, France, where he was living in exile. By laying the groundwork for Iran's nuclear program, Rafsandjani was not pursuing aggressive aims. The fight against Israel was limited to support for Hamas and Hezbollah. Khatami's policy was not significantly different from Rafsandjani's and continued its main lines. The US government had a good perception of his speech at the United Nations and reassuring personality. During a 1998 CNN interview he condemned terrorism and indicated that Iran did not seek to impose its point of view on the Palestinians concerning the peace process or to become a nuclear power. Reacting favorably to the reformers' electoral victory, Madeleine Albright announced the partial lifting of the embargo on US imports of carpets and food products. The gestures stopped short of opening up a dialogue with Washington, which continued to come up against support for Hezbollah, considered by Iran as an asset it could not afford to give up.
3. Iran after September 11, 2001
The September 11 attacks suddenly changed Iran's environment.
First, Iran's biggest two regional adversaries, the Taliban in the east and Saddam Hussein in the west, were ousted. A huge gap separated the Sunni fundamentalist Afghan Taliban and the Iranian Shiites, and Saddam Hussein had never ceased being the Iranian regime's main enemy.
Despite its official opposition to the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian government observed benevolent neutrality towards the United States, even offering to rescue American pilots found on Iranian soil. During the conflict Iran aided the forces of Ismael Kahn, the former governor of Herat province, in the fight against the Taliban. Lastly, Iran played an important part at the late 2001 Bonn conference that presided over the formation of the Afghan government.
Nevertheless, even though Iran had nothing to do with the September 11 attacks and actually adopted a cooperative attitude, George W. Bush called it part of the «axis of evil» in his January 29, 2002 State of the Union address. Afterwards, Washington conducted a systematically hostile policy, describing Iran as a threat to the world and even going so far as to call for «regime change» because of its support for «international terrorism», in this case Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Iran perceived the White House rhetoric, combined with the US military presence on its borders, as existential threats. That might explain the resumption or pursuit of a clandestine nuclear program intended to make the country safe from attack with atomic weapons.
4. Ahmadinejad's verbal extremism
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rose through the ranks of the conservative, religious Islamic right. A member of the pasdarans, he is a perfect example of the «Islamic engineers» who made a name for themselves in other fundamentalist movements. Ahmadinejad was elected mayor of Teheran in 2003 and portrayed himself as the leader of a second revolution aiming to stamp out corruption and Western values. He challenged President Khatami's liberal reforms and stands up for the «have-nots». His power base is the basidj , the pasdarans' strong-armed auxiliary militia.
Ahmadinejad ran for president in June 2005 and surprised everybody by coming in second with 19.4% of the votes behind former president Hashemi Rafsandjani , who only won 21.1%. On 24 June he handily won the second round with 61.69% of the votes compared to 35.93% for Rafsandjani.
In an October 2005 speech on Israel Ahmadinejad said he agreed with Ayatollah Khomeiny 's comment that «the regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time».
After cartoons of Mohammed were published in December 2005 Ahmadinejad denounced the «myth of the massacre of the Jews» and suggested creating a Jewish State in Europe , the United States or Canada . He cast doubt on the reality of the Shoah , called Israel a «tumor» and asked Germany and Austria to give up part of their land to create a new State of Israel.
Ahmadinejad's fiery statements met with widespread disapproval in the West and contributed to the deterioration of Iran's image there. The European countries were tempted to join the US position that it was impossible to negotiate with the Iranian regime, which had become a threat. That view is shared by a number of Gulf States, which, worried about Iran's ambitions and the Sunnis' decline in Iraq, denounce, in the words of Jordan's King Abdallah II, the emergence of a «Shiite crescent».
Two factors temper Iran's apparent return to a policy of Islamic expansionism.
First, the Supreme Guide, not the president, is in charge of foreign policy. Since coming to power in 1989 Ali Khamenei has set a pragmatic course and made defense of Iran's national interests the priority.
Second, anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic statements did not start with Ahmadinejad. They have been unfortunately frequent since the Revolution and do not mean Iran is preparing for a military confrontation with Israel, in which it does not have the means to prevail in any case. Ahmadinejad's goal is to curry favor with the «Arab street» and portray himself as the Arab cause's most hardcore defender.
Iran still has a limited audience in the Arab world. Salafist-inspired movements like Al Qaeda have nothing but contempt for Iran, Shiism's standard-bearer in the Middle East. Sunni governments, especially in the Gulf, look askance at Iran's rising power. Only Syria remains faithful to Teheran, because of its role as an effective counterweight to the United States and a useful ally in Lebanon.
In short, Ahmadinejad's outrageous outbursts please Arab public opinion without really alarming the region's Sunni governments.
5. Mir Hossein Moussavi's victory
It is highly unlikely that Mir Hossein Moussavi's has victory really changed the course of Iranian policy. Western observers thought his vigorous opposition to Ahmadinejad might usher in a shift in direction and an opening of constructive dialogue with the West. Nothing could be less certain.
Moussavi had been the Party of the Islamic Republic's political director and an effective artisan of Imam Khomeiny's rise to power. He briefly served as foreign minister during the 1980 US hostage crisis before becoming prime minister during the Iran-Iraq War from 1981 to 1989, when he was known as a hawk and advocated exporting the Revolution.
During the electoral campaign he came out in favor of continuing Iran's nuclear program, which is not surprising given that, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), he approved the first secret purchases of centrifuges in March 1987.
B. IRAN'S NUCLEAR AMBITION
Iran's policy is now resolutely nationalist. The Islamic Republic intends to dissuade any foe from attacking it and to oppose foreign interference. Iran has developed a multi-pronged strategy to defend itself.
It has strengthened its coastal defenses, which are based in the mountains bordering the Persian Gulf and would make any landing attempt by sea risky and costly in human lives.
Iran has boosted its ability to withstand a possible attack by doubling its communication networks and spreading its military means throughout its territory.
It has acquired the means to extend a possible conflict to other countries with the aim of giving a possible retaliation a wider scope. In addition to its allies in Lebanon and Palestine, it has light, swift craft that can hinder if not interrupt tanker traffic in the Gulf.
Iran has developed a national military industry and its engineers have done all they can to keep the equipment inherited from the Shah, especially aircraft, in proper working order. It has sought to diversify its arms imports, in particular by buying them from Russia. Despite Russia's constant denials, Iran is suspected of acquiring S-300 missiles, the latest-generation anti-air defense system.
It would make sense for Iran to develop nuclear weapons in order to round out its defenses, guarantee its independence and back up its policy as a regional power.
1. Iran's nuclear program
Much has been said and written about Iran's nuclear program. The issue is essential.
a) A civilian or military program?
Iran's officials constantly deny that the country has any intention of developing nuclear weapons, a position defended by Seyed Mehdi Miraboutalebi, the Iranian ambassador in Paris 43 ( * ) .
However, although no formal proof makes it possible to assert that Iran is developing a military nuclear program, some clues indicate that it is.
The first clue is that Iran is pursuing its nuclear activities in utmost secrecy, breaching its commitments to the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), and Iranian officials still refuse to give the IAEA information that would confirm or disprove whether its nuclear program has a military purpose.
In August 2002 the People's Mujahideen--determined, clandestine, left-wing opponents of the regime--disclosed the existence of a huge uranium enrichment plant in Natanz and the building of a heavy water reactor in Arak capable of producing plutonium that could be used to make a nuclear weapon. Why would Iran try to conceal its nuclear program if it had a peaceful purpose?
European pressure led Iran to sign the NPT additional protocol allowing the IAEA to visit its nuclear sites without warning. In December 2003 the Iranian regime agreed to temporarily halt its enrichment activity. In return the European Union agreed to continue talks in the framework of its trade and cooperation agreement with Iran and to endorse its membership in the World Trade Organization. Iran was supposed to stop its enrichment activities until the conclusion of a definitive agreement but after Ahmadinejad's election decided to restart the Natanz plant and to stop applying the additional protocol, which in any case it had not ratified.
In 2006 the IAEA found traces of 36% enriched uranium from Iranian centrifuges, Pakistani blueprints and parts of a Pak 2 centrifuge, prompting it to ask questions about the Iranian program's true nature, which Teheran never answered.
The «European troika» (Great Britain, France and Germany) and the United States submitted the matter to the United Nations Security Council, which issued six resolutions enjoining Iran to immediately take measures prescribed by the IAEA Board of Governors in February 2006.
Three years later the IAEA is still waiting. According to its June 5, 2009 report (GOV/2009/35), "there remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programmed. As indicated in those reports, for the Agency to be able to address these concerns and make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, it is essential that Iran, inter alia, implement the Additional Protocol and provide the information and access requested by the Agency. The Agency has still not received a positive reply from Iran in connection with the Agency's requests for access to relevant information, documentation, locations or individuals."
Second, Iran has no nuclear power plant likely to use the uranium enriched at Natanz. The only nuclear power plant that will soon be in a condition to operate is in Bushehr on the Persian Gulf, which should be up and running by October 2009. Russian engineers have rebuilt this plant, which was originally German. It can only use fuel based on Russian standards, which excludes the uranium enriched in Natanz.
Assuming Iran has civilian nuclear power plants capable of using the uranium enriched in Natanz, it would take approximately 10 years with 50,000 IR-1 centrifuges operating there to produce the amount of enriched uranium necessary to «load» the core of a single reactor. That period could be reduced if the most efficient centrifuges being developed in Iran were installed and the 50,000 centrifuges that Natanz was designed to house were operating at full capacity. But right now just 4,592 centrifuges have been installed and are operating; 3,716 more have been installed but are not yet running 44 ( * ). With 8,300 IR-1 centrifuges it would take approximately 50 years to produce the amount of enriched uranium necessary for a civilian reactor.
Clearly, the Natanz plant fulfills no economic or technical purpose, especially since it would be 10 times less expensive to buy the fuel necessary from Russia (Rosatom) or France (Areva).
At this stage, then, Iran's nuclear program appears to have no civilian usefulness, if not to ensure the start of a self-sufficient supply of enriched uranium, regardless of the additional cost for the nuclear plants that remain to be built. In any case that would require the qualification of the corresponding fuel to be used in civilian nuclear power plants.
The last clue is Iran's progress in the area of ballistic missiles.
On February 2, 2009 Iran successfully fired its latest-generation space launcher, the Safir-2. It put the Omid satellite into orbit at an apogee of 258 kilometers, proving the Islamic Republic's ability to master ballistic missile technology and reach any State in the Middle East. On May 20, 2009 President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had successfully tested a Sejil-2 missile, which has a 1,900-kilometer range.
IRAN'S BALLISTIC AND SPACE ARSENAL
AREAS LOCATED WITHIN THE RANGE
OF IRAN'S PRESENT
BALLISTIC MISSILES
The convergence between enrichment activities and progress in advanced ballistic technology suggests that Iran has a military nuclear program.
b) A nuclear weapon in how much time?
This is an essential but complex question. What steps must Iran clear to make nuclear weapons?
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General concepts about nuclear weapons Two methods can be used to make a first-generation, «rustic» nuclear weapon able to produce a nuclear fission explosion (A-bomb). The one chosen has an influence on the amount of material to assemble, the complexity of the nuclear formula to design and implement and the necessity of whether or not to perform tests. The simple, «gun type» method consists of assembling two sub-critical masses of fissile material in order to reach the critical mass and set off the nuclear explosion by the simple action of a neutron flow. This method requires a significant amount of fissile material: approximately 50kg of highly enriched (in other words at a rate of 90%) U235 uranium (HEU). The 15kT bomb used on Hiroshima was based on this method. The more complex implosion method consists of using a chemical explosive to densify the initially sub-critical fissile material in order to reach the critical mass by implosion and trigger the nuclear reaction. This method can be used with less fissile material: approximately 25kg of HEU, according to the IAEA. The approximately 21kT bomb dropped on Nagasaki was made using this method, but with plutonium 239 instead of uranium. Whatever method is used, the production of a first-generation nuclear warhead requires command of four key steps: 1/ The availability of fissile material : if a uranium bomb is made, the HEU production process involves several steps from the mining of the ore until its transformation into metal in order to make a nuclear payload. The most critical phase is isotopic enrichment, for which several processes exist. Today the preferred process for enriching natural uranium (0.71% in U235) is gaseous ultracentrifugation using uranium hexafluoride (UF6). Civilian energy-producing applications require an enrichment rate of up to 5%; the NPT allows an enrichment rate of up to 20% for research reactors. Plutonium does not lend itself to use in a gun-type weapon and can only be used in an implosion system. 2/ The development of a reliable nuclear payload (or «nuclear device») requires mastering the payload's critical operating stages (detonating the chemical explosive and triggering the neutron flow to set off the fission reaction) and producing sub-assemblies (explosive and fissile material). Together they make up what experts call a nuclear formula, which can be acquired from proliferating networks. The operational use of a gun-type payload can be envisaged without prior validation experimentation. A validation test did not precede the use of the enriched-uranium «Little Boy» bomb on Hiroshima. However, a prior experimental validation is necessary if an implosion weapon is used; that was the case with the «Fat Man» bomb dropped on Nagasaki, which was tested beforehand in the Trinity experiment in the New Mexico desert. Moreover the nuclear safety and security systems taken by a proliferating State acceding to nuclear weapons can be less strict than for a State that already has one. 3/ The militarization of the payload and its integration into a reentry vehicle (both of them forming, with related equipment, a nuclear warhead) must meet several parameters: respect of the mass and volume required for the nuclear warhead in order to ensure the missile's performances, maintenance of the thermal and mechanical conditions acceptable by the nuclear payload when it is carried in the missile and during the warhead's trajectory towards the target. Warhead-missile compatibility can be demonstrated at the same time the warhead is developed and during the missile development stage. However, a proliferating State might wish to skip the militarization and integration stage by dropping the bomb with an airplane instead of having missile carry it. The fourth step is installing the warhead on a missile in order to obtain a ballistic nuclear weapon. This step can be illustrated in a simplified way: |
Nuclear payload
Fissile material
Nuclear formula
Re-entry vehicle
BALLISTIC NUCLEAR WEAPON
Nuclear warhead
Missile
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Obtaining a ballistic nuclear weapon is still enough to have a coherent dissuasion force. It is necessary to have several weapons capable of penetrating enemy defenses integrated into an appropriate weapons system (protected launch sites, radars, etc.) |
1. Production of fissile material
A country pursuing military aims could consider taking the following steps, in which ultracentrifugation is used, to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium:
- step one, enrichment to 5%, the limit for civil-industrial purposes, can be done at the Natanz site;
- step two, enrichment to 20% (authorized by the NPT for research reactors) can also be done at Natanz or another, much smaller site; Natanz is the only site that has been declared thus far.
Highly enriched uranium can be produced in one or two steps, either at a smaller undeclared site with approximately 1,000 IR1 centrifuges or at the Natanz site. Iran is therefore in a position of conflict with the IAEA and the international community.
The fact that only the first type of plant has been declared makes it impossible to conclude whether or not others exist. Given their small sizes, they can be hidden at the Natanz site itself or one of the country's possible facilities elsewhere.
The Arak reactor, under construction , is apparently adapted to plutonium production, but starting the reactor up is not conceivable before several years. By then Iran is likely to have a reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from irradiated fuel. No such facility in Iran is known so far. The Bushehr nuclear power plant, which the Russians are currently building, should be up and running in 2010. However, this pressurized light water reactor, which the IAEA is monitoring, seems poorly adapted to the production of weapons-grade plutonium.
2. The availability of sufficient amounts of fissile material
In early 2009 Iran produced a metric ton of UF6 including approximately 700kg of 3.5%- enriched-uranium. In August 1,430kg were obtained. It takes 1.6 metric ton of UF6 3.5%-enriched-uranium to obtain 25kg of 90%-enriched-uranium, the amount the IAEA deems necessary to make a first-generation implosion nuclear payload. Iran can therefore be considered close to having completed the first enrichment stage if its goal is military.
To carry out the later steps, according to the information available to the rapporteurs it can be said that if the program unfolded in the best possible conditions (with a low centrifuge breakdown rate) Iran could have enough highly enriched uranium by approximately summer 2010, if it has already built the plants required for the other steps.
Iran has no know facility capable of producing plutonium.
3. The development and vectorization of a nuclear payload
When Iran will have produced enough highly enriched uranium plutonium to make an implosion nuclear device (25kg) and mastered the detonation technology (which seems likely), it will take just a few months to have a nuclear payload, in other words by late 2010.
The next step, after a nuclear test and a demonstration of its nuclear capability, would be for Iran to vectorize the payload, integrating it into a ballistic missile, which the Islamic Republic might prefer to making an airborne bomb, considering the defense systems it would have to penetrate.
The transition stage from nuclear payload to vectorized nuclear warhead could take place at the same time as the development of a missile and require anywhere from a few months to several years, depending on how much knowledge Iran has acquired in this area.
The study the mission carried out convinced it that if Iran achieved the best results when carrying out all the steps the country could have a first-generation nuclear weapon within 18 months, in other words by late 2010. It would be a single device that would not have been tested and whose adaptation to a ballistic missile would not have been demonstrated.
Iran would not be in a position to prove its command of the weapon and could therefore not use it to dissuade possible enemies. It would need at least two weapons, which would take at least another year and a half to build; in other words it would not be ready until 2011-2012.
In addition, it would be necessary for Iran to have:
• already built the secret plants necessary to produce HEU or reconfigured the Natanz site without the IAEA's knowledge;
• and developed, at the same time, all the technology required to militarize the device.
Such a scenario seems highly unlikely.
However, if Iran seeks to acquire a nuclear arsenal, even if it is small but capable of dissuading a possible aggressor, it seems, after consultation with several French experts, that it could probably cross that threshold by around 2015.
That estimate differs little from other known studies on the issue. In its 2008 report the British House of Commons' Foreign Affairs Committee said that Iran could produce enough HEU for a weapon by late 2009 at the earliest, but that is highly unlikely. The report said Iran would be technically capable of making enough HEU between 2010 and 2015.»
The rapporteurs therefore conclude that:
• at the present time nothing makes it possible to prove or disprove that Iran has a military nuclear program;
• but there are good reasons to believe it does have that goal , including the program's secret character at the beginning, impossibility for the IAEA to make the inspections it deems necessary, very low economic and technical rationality of the program under way if it is intended for peaceful purposes, convergence between command of uranium enrichment and long-range ballistic missile technologies;
• if Iran were pursuing a military option, it would be in a position, in the best of cases, to have its first nuclear device by late 2010 and a coherent dissuasion system by around 2015.
2. What dangers would Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon present?
a) An Israeli attack on nuclear sites
In theory a nuclear Iran would not be a serious threat to Europe or the United States, but it would be for Israel. Considering its size, a single nuclear weapon could endanger the Jewish State's future. Its leaders understandably refuse to take the slightest risk and believe that the preventive destruction of Iran's military nuclear capability is necessary, just as it was for Iraq's capabilities in 1982 and Syria's in 2007.
Statements by Iran's leaders only strengthen the perception of that threat. In 1980 Ayatollah Khomeiny is reported to have said, « We do not worship Iran, we worship Allah. Patriotism is the mask of paganism. I tell you: this country can burn. I tell you: this country can go up in smoke, as long as Islam comes out triumphant in the rest of the world.» 45 ( * ) It took 500,000 Iranian dead for Khomeiny to stop the war with Iraq, which could have been ended much sooner. Ayatollah Khamenei received his religious education at the Mashad seminary, where teachers offer esoteric interpretations of the holy texts and teach that reason and faith are incompatible. President Ahmadinejad has been influenced by the messianism of Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi Mezbah Yazdi. Even speeches by Iranian leaders reputed to be pragmatic raise questions. Hashemi Rafsandjani's statement, «the use of a single nuclear weapon against Israel would lay waste to everything in that land (of Israel) but cause only limited damage to the Muslim world» 46 ( * ) prompts mistrust.
Many Iran experts believe that the Islamic Republic's leaders, whatever they say, are cautious and do not want war. Nevertheless, Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons would probably be a blow to stability.
In that context, an attack by Israel's armed forces is not unlikely. Could they do it alone or would they need help from the United States?
A recent study by the American think tank CSIS sheds interesting light on this issue, which the rapporteurs compared with their own investigations 47 ( * ) .
A nuanced response is necessary. Israel's air force may not have the capability to destroy deeply buried sites such as Natanz 48 ( * ) beyond the shadow of a doubt, but alone they could, at the cost of significant casualties, destroy Natanz or seriously damage two or three sites such as Natanz, Arak and Isfahan.
It is nearly certain that Israel does not have the means to destroy all the sites involved in Iran's nuclear program in a single raid: there are too many of them and they are too well protected.
Such an attack would delay Iran's program for several years but not stop it . Because the program is military, one or more hidden sites probably exist. In any case, Iranian engineers' technological know-how could not be destroyed.
Teheran could unleash many punishing reprisals: blockading the Straits of Hormuz, attacking certain Gulf States, launching Hezbollah and Hamas offensives, firing conventional ballistic missiles into Israel, etc. However, Iran might limit its retaliation to avoid giving the United States a motive to intervene.
An Israeli attack would probably cause Iran to drop out of the non-proliferation treaty, whose goal is to convince countries to give up nuclear weapons by facilitating access to civilian nuclear power. But the treaty has been in serious trouble since India, Pakistan and Israel have shown that by refusing to sign it they have been able to develop nuclear weapons and avoid the IAEA's control.
b) Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and the end of the NPT
Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons would almost certainly set off a nuclear arms race in the region. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria would try and follow Iran's example. Further afield, Turkey and Algeria might start or resume military nuclear activities.
Saudi Arabia , which is often diplomatically at odds with Iran, would react. The prestige Iran would win in the Muslim world from possessing nuclear weapons would surely prompt Saudi Arabia to follow suit and cross that strategic threshold. Right now the country only has limited nuclear facilities: the Atomic Energy Research Institute created in 1988 and the nuclear engineering department at King Abdul Aziz University founded in 1977. Saudi Arabia also has four laboratories that could contribute to a weapons-grade plutonium production program. In 1988 it purchased a significant number of Chinese CSS-2 missiles that can carry a payload of over two metric tons each. The quickest and most effective option would be to conclude an alliance with Pakistan. In 2003 Pakistani officials openly mentioned the possibility of setting up a mechanism similar to NATO with Saudi Arabia in the nuclear arena. Some experts 49 ( * ) say the two countries are in a state of advanced dialogue and that Pakistani officials may grant Saudi Arabia a security guarantee.
Egypt probably has the region's most advanced nuclear infrastructure and experience. It possesses two research reactors as well as, since 1998, two fuel-producing facilities. The Inshas research center is reported to have conducted many undeclared experiments that could be used to develop a military program. In addition, Cairo and Tripoli are said to have cooperated in this area until the Libyan program ended in 2003. Egypt has laid the groundwork for a military nuclear program and its ore reserves would probably give it a certain degree of autonomy. In 1998 President Hosni Mubarak said, «when the time comes, if we need nuclear weapons we will not hesitate». If Iran acquires nuclear weapons it is likely that Egypt «will not hesitate». Egypt views Iran as a threat and has been worried since Hamas took control of Gaza that it will increase its influence on its borders. The enmity between them has never been a secret: they do not have diplomatic relations and the Iranian government has just authorized a movie glorifying Anwar al-Sadat's assassins. Saudi nuclear capability would have similar effects and it can be safely assumed that Egypt would not like to be seen as a laggard in the Arab world: its national pride would be at stake. However, Egypt's finances do not leave the country with a wide margin of maneuver, unless it obtains financial aid from the Gulf Emirates.
Syria has an embryonic nuclear program. The two research centers near Damascus are not very technically advanced. However, the country has big phosphate deposits suitable for large-scale uranium mining and built a facility for that purpose that has been operational since 1996. The discovery of the Al Kibar reactor near Dayr az Zawr surprised most analysts. In April 2008 the US administration presented to Congress and the press documents showing that the site Israeli aviation destroyed in September 2007 was a nuclear reactor built with help from North Korea.
If Iran acquired nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation throughout the Middle East would be a likely scenario spelling the end of the NPT.
The United States and its European allies would probably consider offering the Arab countries security guarantees but they would hesitate accepting for fear of appearing like Western lackeys, so that would be no better than an a transitional solution. If Iran acquired nuclear weapons it would be hard to talk the Gulf States and Egypt out of following its example.
C. HOW TO CONVINCE IRAN NOT TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AVOID A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
1. Talks have not stopped Iran's nuclear program
The United States has said a nuclear-armed Iran would be unacceptable and that, if the country did not halt its enrichment program, «all options are on the table». Washington has had no relations with Iran since its embassy was occupied in 1979, so the task of starting a «critical dialogue» with the Islamic Republic has fallen to Europe, which in 2003 entrusted Great Britain, Germany and France with the mission of conducting talks on the European Union's behalf. After several years of unsuccessful efforts, Europe decided to refer the matter to the UN Security Council, which enjoined Teheran to interrupt its enrichment activity. Iran failed to comply, so the Council voted to impose sanctions, which have had no effect.
One reason Iran has turned a deaf ear to Europe's arguments and proposals is that there is a strong national consensus in favor of the nuclear program . What is more, decision-making processes are complex in Teheran. The government is split into several factions, each with its own agenda, so stopping such a strategic program comes up against nearly insurmountable obstacles.
2. It is unlikely that force can stop Iran's nuclear program
The United States has examined the hypothesis of destroying sites with an air attack and presented it as a possible «solution» during George W. Bush's term. In early 2005 American journalist Seymour Hersch revealed that the US government still preferred the military option and started trying to locate all of Iran's production sites, but President Bush gave up the idea of an attack, which President Obama is not planning either.
Contrary to what one might think, Israel has not decided anything. The official position is clear: an Iranian nuclear arsenal would be an «existential» threat. However, there are two schools of thought. One would be resigned to nuclear proliferation and emphasize future strategic balances. The other is intent on stopping Iran at all costs. The rapporteurs met representatives of each school in Israeli think tanks.
Part of the debate in Israel is not about the feasibility of an attack but about whether Iranian reprisals would make the cost too high. In that perspective, Israel's armed forces have apparently stepped up their dissuasion force's second strike capability: Harpoon missiles fired from Dolphin submarine have been fitted with nuclear warheads, silos have been hardened, etc. Israel has also updated its anti-ballistic defense by deploying US Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 anti-missile systems.
3. The only way left is sanctions
The economic sanctions voted by the Security Council five times have had no effect on Iran's behavior. Iran has continued supporting Hezbollah, maintained the fatwa against Salman Rushdie and neither ratified nor applied the NPT additional protocol, leaving the IAEA in the dark. For Iran to envisage reconsidering its position, Germany, Italy, France, Russia and China would have to agree to vote harsher sanctions. Would they work? Probably not. The cases of Cuba and Iraq show that embargoes penalize ordinary people while leaving regimes unshaken.
How can the Iran regime be convinced to give up its nuclear ambitions? Like most dictatorships, it needs external crises to draw attention away from its domestic problems. Threats to Iran help the regime tighten its grip on power.
The prospects of a nuclear Iran should not, in itself, frighten us . There is no reason to think that dissuasion will not work as it always has. Iran's leaders hate the West and Israel but they care about their country and their power and they are rational people.
But a nuclear Iran would trigger an arms race throughout the region and that would be a threat to world peace.
That is why we must prepare to toughen sanctions, in close cooperation with China and Russia .
Sanctions, modest though they may be, have had harmful effects on the population and the reactions to the falsification of the latest presidential elections' results have shown the scope of popular discontent.
During the street protests following the presidential elections Ahmadinejad owed his grip on power only to support from the Supreme Guide, the pasdarans' and basidj 's strong-arm tactics and the patronage network he tirelessly maintains.
President Obama made a significant gesture by stretching out his hand to the Iranian government and saying, in his Cairo speech, that the United States was ready to start a dialogue with Iran on all issues without prior conditions. That approach coincides with and strengthens that of Europe and should make it possible to verify if the policy of openness has any chance of success between now and the end of 2009.
If it does not, the time will have come to impose truly effective sanctions on Iran. One would be an embargo on refined petroleum products, in particular gasoline. Iran is a huge consumer of gasoline and imports 40% of it. Government rationing in the summer of 2007 sparked riots and violence, compelling the authorities to reverse their decision. There is every reason to believe that a more or less complete halt of deliveries of refined petroleum products to Iran would prompt the government to stop and think. That step would be taken in consultation with the Gulf States to limit the impact of Iran's likely reprisal on the global market in terms of cutting off oil deliveries. It is imperative to associate China and Russia with this policy in order to ensure its effectiveness.
* 39 See «Ahmadinejad et les conservateurs: les raisons de la colère» by Hossein Bastani, former secretary-general of the Iranian journalists' union exiled in France and editor-in-chief of the Roozonline.com information site. See also the special issue on Iran of the journal Moyen-Orient , number one, August-September 2009.
* 40 The following text owes much to Thierry Coville's Iran la Révolution invisible , Paris Ed. La Découverte - April 2007 and to Bernard Hourcade, former director of the Institut français de recherche en Iran, both of whom were interviewed by the mission.
* 41 Op. cit. p. 197
* 42 Literally, «the government of jurisconsul», all the principles underpinning the idea that the supreme guide must be a clergyman.
* 43 See the official letter Iran's ambassador in France sent to the President of the Senate on 26 May 2009 in appendix 9.
* 44 IAEA director-general's report to the board of governors on 28 August 2009.
* 45 According to Bruno Tertrais qutoed in Norman Podohoretz; «The case for bombing Iran», Commentary , June 2007. The veracity of this quote, originally published by the expert Amir Taheri in his book Nest of Spies , is disputable («Is Iran suicidal ordeterrable?» Economist.com, 14 November 2007).
* 46 Quoted in Amir Taheri: «Recipe for disaster» - The National Review , 14 November 2003
* 47 Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran's Nuclear Development Facilities - Abdullah Toukan, Senior Associate and Anthony H. Cordesman 14 March 2009
* 48 In this case American GBU-28 bunker-busting bombs.
* 49 See Bruno Tertrais's report on the strategic consequences of Iran's possible access to nuclear weapons, Paris, October 23, 2003 Fondation pour la recherche stratégique.