CHAPTER II - A TWO-PRONGED CHALLENGE
Two problems dominate the Middle East and pose hard challenges for the West. The first is ensuring the Palestinian people's future without compromising Israel's existence. The second is convincing Iran to stop its nuclear program and preventing the nuclearization of Middle East without resorting to force. Yesterday, solving those two problems seemed out of reach. Today, the election of a new president of the United States has changed the outlook.
I. PEACE AND SECURITY FOR ALL: CREATING A PALESTINIAN STATE
It is nearly impossible to travel anywhere in the Middle East without hearing about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Solving it is vitally important for all the region's countries, including Syria, whose Golan Heights are still occupied; Lebanon, which has over 400,000 Palestinian refugees on its soil; and Egypt, whose diplomats have made considerable efforts to promote a peaceful settlement. More generally, the conflict is part of everyday Arab political discourse, from heads of State to senior managers or shopkeepers.
The conflict is at the heart of East-West relations and therefore directly affects us. The overwhelming majority of Muslims believes that the West does not respect Islam, pointing as proof to "the unjust double standard" that accepts Israel's atomic bomb but rejects Iran's and condemns Hamas's rocket attacks but not the Gaza blockade that caused them.
Yet nobody has ever been able to break the deadlock: neither US President Bill Clinton, who got Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin to shake hands on the White House lawn in 1993, nor the members of the "Quartet" (the United Nations, European Union, United States and Russia), which adopted the "roadmap" in 2003 in order to settle the conflict step-by-step based on a two-state solution.
Each time, the same issues--the status of Jerusalem, fate of Palestinian refugees and growth of Israeli settlements--accompanied by terrorist attacks that bloodied the region for 15 years--the assassination of Rabin, tragedy of Gaza and second Intifada--shattered hopes for peace.
Yet nobody doubts that peace is necessary for better relations between the West and the Arab world. But matters more: " security" , which the Israelis want, or " justice" , which the Palestinians demand?
Those are the terms in which the June 13, 1980 Venice Declaration spelled out the issue, asserting that "the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."
Thirty years later the situation has not only remained unchanged but regressed. Not only has no peace treaty been signed, but there are no longer even any partners to negotiate one. The Palestinian movement has split into two hostile entities incapable of naming a single interlocutor. The current Israeli government only half-heartedly accepts the idea of a Palestinian State, even if it were reduced to an Israeli protectorate. How can the deadlock be broken?
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A 20-year "peace process" The Israeli-Palestinian peace process began in 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, with the Madrid conference, when Israel agreed to recognize the PLO as a negotiating partner. The process groups together all the diplomatic agreements concluded since then to find a solution to the conflict. The Oslo accords, which Yasser Arafat and Itzhak Rabin sign in Washington in the presence of Bill Clinton on September 13, 1993 , calls for the mutual recognition of the PLO and Israel and temporary five-year Palestinian autonomy. The Oslo process, which is completed in 1994, gives the new Palestinian National Authority limited powers. The 1995 Oslo II accords divides the West Bank into three zones based on how much control the PA is granted over each one. From July 11 to 25, 2000 the Camp David summit brings Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat together in the presence of Bill Clinton. The parties are unable to find a compromise because they fail to agree on three points--the size of territorial concessions, status of Jerusalem and refugees' right of return--but lay the groundwork for future talks: the search for a just and lasting solution; commitment to settle existing issues as quickly as possible and to create an environment conducive to negotiations, without pressure, intimidation or threats of violence; commitment to refrain from taking measures that would unilaterally prefigure the terms of future accords; and recognition of the United States as an essential partner in the peace process. Bill Clinton's December 23, 2000 peace plan spells out the "Clinton parameters" for a solution to the problem (which Shlomo Ben-Ami, Saeb Erekat and Madeleine Albright subsequently discussed at the January 2001 Taba Summit). The parties later say this is the closest they ever came to an agreement. The June 2002 Arab peace initiative : meeting in Beirut, the Arab League, under the authority of Saudi Arabia's Prince Abdallah, presents a plan calling for a return to the 1967 borders, including with Syria and Lebanon, in exchange for mutual recognition, the normalization of diplomatic relations and a peace agreement between Israel and all the Arab countries. The Israeli government rejects a total pullout from the West Bank and East Jerusalem and strongly opposes the mass return of Palestinian refugees to Israel. The April 30, 2003 roadmap : the Quartet--the United States led by the new president George W. Bush, the European Union, Russia and the UN--drafts the "roadmap" for peace, which calls for the creation of a Palestinian State by 2005, subject to the cessation of terrorist acts and the holding of democratic elections in the Palestinian territories. The December 1, 2003 Geneva initiative , whose main architects are former Israeli minister Yossi Beilin and former Palestinian minister Yasser Abd Rabbo, calls for divided sovereignty over Jerusalem; Israel's evacuation of 98% of the West Bank and all of the Gaza Strip; and the settlement of the issue of circulation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The problem of the refugees' right of return will be settled by compensating them. Arafat accepts the document and Sharon rejects it. The February 8, 2005 Sharm el-Sheikh summit (Ariel Sharon-Mahmoud Abbas in the presence of Hosni Mubarak and Jordan's Abdallah II) is basically a ceasefire agreement ending the second Intifada and calling for the exchange of prisoners. Israel's 2005 unilateral Gaza withdrawal plan , which the Israeli government adopted on June 6, 2004, stipulates that the Israeli army will monitor the border between Egypt and Gaza, continue controlling the border around the Gaza Strip, the coasts and air space, and maintain the right to conduct military operations inside that territory. Furthermore, Gaza will remain dependant on Israel for water, means of communication, power and wastewater drainage systems. Imports to the territory will not be taxed but exports will. Israel will collect a tax on foreign products imported to Gaza. The shekel will continue to be the legal currency. The November 26, 2007 Annapolis declaration officializes the "two-State solution" for the first time. |
A. THE DIFFICULT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN PALESTINIANS
The Palestinian political movement is now split into two mutually antagonistic organizations, each with its own territorial base: Fatah on the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza.
1. The origins of the rift: the transformation of Hamas into a political movement
A brief historical summary is necessary to understand the current situation.
a) The Palestinian movement
The Palestinian movement has not always been divided. From 1964, when the PLO was created, to 1987, under Yasser Arafat's leadership, it was sufficiently united to conduct negotiations. That is no longer the case.
1. Fatah
Certain that the most effective way to defend the Palestinian people's rights was to organize a national revolutionary movement independent of the Arab countries, Yasser Arafat and other leaders founded Fatah, or "Palestinian National Liberation Movement", in Kuwait in 1959. They called for armed struggle with the aim of "liberating all Palestinian territory from the Zionist entity".
Although nearly all Fatah's members are Muslims, the movement declared itself to be secular and politically neutral, in contrast with the avowedly Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The end goal is the establishment of an independent, democratic Palestinian State where all citizens enjoy equal rights regardless of their religion.
2. The Palestine Liberation Organization
After the first meeting of the Palestinian National Congress (PNC), and on the Arab League's initiative, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Ahmed Shukhairy, was created in Jerusalem in 1964. Unlike Fatah, the PLO's aim was not the creation of a Palestinian State but the liberation of Palestine within the wider framework of the creation of an Arab republic. The new organization was a federation of various groups. At its head, an executive council made decisions, while the National Council served as a representative assembly.
Israel's victory in the 1967 Six Day War shook the PLO, considered too close to the Arab régimes, to its very core and Shukhairy resigned. In 1968 Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which George Habash and Ahmed Jibril founded in 1967, joined the PLO and won half the seats in the PNC. Arafat had the PLO charter amended to take account of Fatah aims. Under his leadership the organization made a commitment to armed struggle and claimed responsibility for many terrorist attacks in Israel and around the world.
At the 1974 Rabat summit the PLO won all the Arab States' diplomatic recognition as the Palestinian people's sole representative. Later that year it obtained observer status at the United Nations, where Arafat made a speech holding a gun in one hand and an olive branch in the other. In 1976 the group joined the Arab League with the rank of a State. Spain became the first country to give a PLO representation full diplomatic status, followed by Portugal, Austria, France, Italy and Greece. Meanwhile, Israel continued to consider it a terrorist group. In 1982 the Israeli army drove the organization out of Beirut. Fatah's partisans fled to Syria and other Arab countries. Arafat and his closest associates took refuge in Tunis.
The PLO gradually fell apart and was on the verge of vanishing altogether when a spontaneous popular uprising, the first Intifada, broke out in the Israeli-occupied territories. It lasted from December 8, 1987 to 1992. Arafat regained control of and reorganized the PLO, whose legitimacy as the Palestinian people's sole representative was restored. In 1988 he proclaimed the establishment of a Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital. He also had the Palestinian National Council adopt a motion accepting the 1967 United Nations Security Council resolution 242 calling for "acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries".
Amending the article of the charter calling for the destruction of Israel and renouncing armed struggle, Arafat wrote a letter on September 9, 1993 to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in which he recognized, on behalf of the PLO, Israel's right to live in peace. In return Rabin recognized the PLO. On September 13, 1993, under US President Bill Clinton's auspices in Washington, they signed the Oslo mutual recognition accords and a declaration clearing the way for a Palestinian administration in the occupied territories.
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Letters of mutual recognition exchanged between Mr. Arafat and Mr. Rabin Letter from Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat recognizing the State of Israel (Tunis, September 9, 1993) Mr. Prime Minister, The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following PLO commitments: The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations. The PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators. In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the Declaration of Principles and based on Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant. Yasser Arafat , Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization Letter from Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, recognizing the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people (Jerusalem, September 10, 1993). In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that, in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister |
In 1996, after the Palestinian Authority was set up following the terms of the Oslo accords, Fatah elements joined the new administration and Fatah leader and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat was formally elected head of the Authority. Almost all the Authority's civil servants are former Fatah members; fighters from former Fatah brigades trained the Palestinian security forces.
3. Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt in the 1920s, took root in the Gaza Strip immediately after the Six Day War and rode the wave of Islamic fundamentalism fueled by Arab nationalism's repeated failures to defeat Israel 14 ( * ) .
At first the Muslim Brotherhood was a social movement. It did not aim to conquer power but to change society. In the occupied territories the Brotherhood built a dense network of social institutions around mosques: kindergartens, libraries, clinics, sports clubs, etc. Created in 1973, the Gaza Islamic Centre, headed by Sheikh Ahmed Yassine, became an important hub of social life. The organization received support from abroad, in particular Saudi Arabia, which sent it considerable funds.
The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood's popularity soon crumbled because of its decision to steer clear of politics. It focused on developing individual piety and enforcing religious precepts, preferring to stay out of the nationalist struggle. Consequently, Israel's intelligence service, Mossad, adopted a hands-off attitude towards the group, considering it a useful counterweight to the PLO 15 ( * ) . But in 1980 the movement split: Islamic Jihad denounced the Muslim Brotherhood's passivity and committed itself to violent action.
The decision to create Hamas is linked to the first Intifada. In December 1987 Sheikh Yassine took the traditional line because he was convinced a confrontation with Israel would cost his movement too much. It was only after the uprising started and under pressure from the rising generations that he changed his mind and had a leaflet circulated calling on Palestinians to join the Intifada. This was the birth certificate of Hamas, the acronym of harakat al-muqâwama al-'islâmiya ("Islamic resistance movement). The entire Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood joined Hamas, giving it considerable strength, especially in the Gaza Strip, where its members attacked isolated Israeli soldiers and burned Israeli-owned property.
On August 18, 1988 Hamas adopted its charter 16 ( * ) , in which it acknowledged its relationship to Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood organization and stated that Palestine is "an Islamic land for all generations of Muslims until Resurrection Day". Despite rivalries and sometimes even clashes, Hamas said about the PLO, "We have the same homeland, the same misfortune, the same destiny and the same enemy."
b) The roots of discord
The discord stems from the Muslim Brotherhood's transformation into a political movement, Hamas, in head-on competition with Fatah.
Hamas burst upon the political scene by objecting to the PLO's accommodation of Israel, espousing the ideas the older organization had advocated before the mid-1970s, namely the liberation of all Palestine, whereas Arafat had moved on and was preparing to have the PNC recognize its partition.
Israeli officials completely changed their attitude towards Hamas, which took a harder political line than Fatah, and sought to curb its growth. In May 1989 Israeli security services arrested 260 Hamas militants, including Sheikh Yassine, for murder and incitement to violence. He was released in 1997 to prevent Palestinian reprisals after Mossad tried to assassinate Khaled Meshaal in Jordan.
Sheikh Yassine rejected the Oslo accords from his prison cell in 1993. Instead he proposed a hudna (truce), in reference to Islamic law, which allows a conditional ceasefire with non-Muslims limited to 10 years maximum, under the condition that Israel pull out of the occupied territories. The principle of non-recognition of the State of Israel in the Hamas Charter was not called into question. Thus, Hamas and the PLO have very different strategies.
The setting up of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza in 1994 created new challenges for Hamas, which was pulled in different directions by its rhetoric espousing the total liberation of Palestine, desire to prevent the outbreak of a Palestinian civil war, and determination to preserve its network of grass-roots organizations. The group began a dialogue with Yasser Arafat, who held out the carrot and the stick, stepping up arrests and intimidation while talking to the Organization and authorizing some of its press organs. In late 1995 he even seemed to be on the verge of letting Hamas participate in the January 1996 elections to the Palestinian Parliament, which it would have rejected.
Itzhak Rabin's assassination in November 1995, the escalation between Israeli forces and Hamas marked by a wave of suicide bombings in 1996, the ongoing expansion of Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory and Benjamin Netanyahou's victory in Israel's 1996 legislative elections changed everything and prompted Hamas to take a line of violent, radical opposition that associated Fatah with the failure of the peace process and the Palestinian Authority's ineffectiveness.
The hard line came into its own with the second Intifada, which broke out in September 2000 and definitively split the two movements. Hamas's military leaders organized a suicide bombing campaign that climaxed in 2002, killing over 200 Israeli civilians and wounding 2,000 others in that year alone. In 2003 Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, one of Hamas's co-founders, said that the Shoah had never happened. Hamas's television network, Al Aqsa TV, broadcast programs with anti-Semitic overtones. That was not to be forgotten in Israel.
Canada, Japan, the United States and Israel put Hamas on their lists of terrorist organizations in 2002, the European Union in September 2003. In Great Britain and Australia only the armed branch of Hamas, the Ezzedine Al-Qassam brigades, was declared terrorist. On March 22, 2004, on orders from Ariel Sharon, the Israeli air force assassinated Sheikh Yassine in Gaza in a "targeted execution" in retaliation for suicide attacks. His successor Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi was assassinated a few days after his appointment. The PLO and Fatah now seemed moderate compared to Hamas.
c) Mahmoud Abbas's election in 2005
When Arafat died on November 11, 2004 it was only natural for Mahmoud Abbas to succeed him. Under the nom de guerre Abu Mazen, he was one of Fatah's founders in 1959. Abbas had belonged to the movement's radical wing and helped plan the 1972 attack on the Israeli Olympic team in Munich 17 ( * ) . He had been Arafat's faithful companion, following him everywhere he went in exile, participating in the launch of secret talks in Oslo and serving as PLO General Secretary. In addition, he had been Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority and even opposed Arafat to try and establish his authority over the administration. He had experience with power and enjoyed a certain aura in Palestinian society.
As soon as the second Intifada broke out, Abbas requested an end to attacks against Israel, which had begun to consider him an "acceptable interlocutor". He also enjoyed support from the Western powers, which had required Arafat to create the prime minister position for him in 2003. His candidacy was even stronger since his main rival, Marwan Barghouti, a secular centrist, was in an Israeli prison for his involvement in the second Intifada.
Although opposed to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Abbas failed to obtain control of the security forces, making him a candidate acceptable for all Palestinians.
Hamas did not run a candidate against Abbas in the presidential elections because he refused to let it join the Oslo accord institutions. In a strong position because of the absence of a credible opposition and his personal background, Abbas won the presidential election on January 9, 2005.
His election changed everything. "Yasser Arafat conducted a complicated policy trying to keep a balance between Fatah and Hamas," wrote the historian Henry Laurens. "He always held to his cardinal rule: avoid a Palestinian civil war, even if it means lying, using trickery or contradicting himself from one day to the next." 18 ( * ) . Abbas's election as president of the Palestinian Authority spelled the end of the balancing act, especially since Hamas changed its strategy and completed its transformation from a social movement into a political force with aspirations of becoming the Palestinian people's legitimate leader.
d) Hamas's victory in the legislative elections and the start of the Gaza blockade19 ( * )
Hamas candidates ran in the 2005 Palestinian municipal elections. Their success consecrated the organization as a significant political force opposed to Fatah.
On January 25, 2006 legislative elections took place on the West Bank and in Gaza under the watchful eye of international observers. Hamas won the elections, which were considered free and fair, with 42.9% of the vote.
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Party |
% |
Votes |
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42,9 |
434 817 |
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39,8 |
403 458 |
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4,1 |
41 671 |
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2,8 |
28 779 |
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2,6 |
26 554 |
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2,3 |
23 513 |
2 |
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Independents |
5,2 |
- |
4 |
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Others |
0,3 |
53 200 |
0 |
In the Gaza Strip Hamas had an even stronger lead, with 48.2% of the vote compared to 43.6% for Fatah. Of the Palestinian Parliament's 132 deputies, 74 are Hamas members compared to 45 for Fatah.
Two factors seem to have been decisive in Hamas's success: the corruption of the Palestinian Authority (and therefore of Fatah) and, above all, the fact that the road Fatah chose in Oslo--negotiation and the abandonment of armed struggle--has run into a dead end. Hamas says it is not hostile to talks but thinks they must be accompanied by military pressure. Some Fatah leaders, in particular Marwan Barghouti, defended the same position early in the second Intifada.
On February 21, 2006 Mahmoud Abbas named Hamas member Ismail Haniyeh prime minister. On March 19, after unsuccessful negotiations, Haniyeh announced the formation of his government, with Fatah refusing to join.
Israel refused contact with the Hamas government. Ehud Olmert, the new prime minister, decided to suspend the transfer of customs duties it owed the Palestinian Authority. Many donors, including the European Union, also suspended their financial aid. The entrance and exit points between Gaza and Israel were often closed, resulting in food shortages for 1.5 million people. The Gaza blockade was on.
On June 9, 2006 an Israeli Navy bombardment killed ten Palestinian civilians. In reprisal, after an 18-month truce rockets were fired from Gaza into Israel. On June 25 Palestinian commandos attacked an Israeli army camp in southern Gaza, killing two soldiers, wounding two others and kidnapping French-Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit.
On June 28 Israel responded with a bombing campaign, "Summer Rains", and arrested eight ministers, several deputies and Hamas officials in the Gaza Strip. The operation lasted until November 26. By September, five months after the Gaza blockade started, the humanitarian situation was very bad, as the ICRC attested.
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12-09-2006 Press release Gaza -ICRC bulletin no. 06 / 2006 General situation The almost permanent closure of entry and exit points, the continued incursions by Israeli military forces and the non-payment of salaries to civil servants continue to mark the lives of the 1.4 million residents of the Gaza strip. The mood of the population is described as one of despair, with little hope seen for any improvement in the situation.. An estimated two thirds of Gaza's residents are now living below the poverty line of 2 US dollars per day. Many have reduced their essential expenses to meet minimum nutritional requirements... |
In autumn 2006 tensions were running high between Hamas and Fatah. Abbas asked Hamas to recognize the accords already negotiated with Israel, while Islamic fundamentalist leaders rejected what might be interpreted as implicit recognition of the State of Israel. Abbas outlawed the Hamas militia, which marked the start of violent clashes between the two movements. Until then the conflict between Hamas and Fatah had been primarily political. Now it was also military.
e) The Mecca agreement and the national unity government
On February 8, 2007 Hamas and Fatah announced an agreement in Mecca to form a national unity government led by acting Prime Minister Haniyeh. Talks between President Abbas and Hamas's exiled leader Khaled Meshaal led to a distribution of ministerial positions and a common political program including respect for the Israeli-Palestinian accords already signed but not recognition of Israel.
By putting Haniyeh in charge of forming the national unity government President Abbas affirmed that the expected cabinet had to "respect" the accords concluded by the PLO, including those signed with Israel, which implicitly amounted to recognition of the Jewish State.
The United States and Europe overlooked this major advance and demanded explicit recognition of Israel in exchange for resuming ties with Haniyeh's government.
Hamas refused, invoking the Mecca agreement, which did not require it to do so. It nevertheless agreed that the national unity government in which it participated would respect the accords signed by the PLO, which indirectly amounted to the same thing.
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The February 8, 2007 Mecca agreement The accord sought to:
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f) Hamas's seizure of power in Gaza
Despite the Mecca accord, the ceasefire was broken on May 18, 2007. On June 7, 115 people died and 550 were wounded in clashes between the two factions. Human Rights Watch accused both sides of violating international humanitarian law and, in some cases, war crimes. On June 14 Hamas took control by force of the entire Gaza Strip.
Abbas responded by declaring a state of emergency, dismissing the national unity government and putting Salam Fayyad, the previous government's finance minister, in charge of forming an emergency cabinet.
Fayyad's government was sworn in on June 17 in Ramallah. It was not recognized by Hamas, which declared the new prime minister's appointment unconstitutional. They had a point: the Palestinian Authority's president should have chosen the new prime minister from the ranks of the majority party, Hamas 20 ( * ) .
The Western powers backed Abbas and Fayyad's government. Hamas controlled the Gaza Strip, while the West Bank was in Fatah's hands. The Palestinian territories were de facto split into two entities controlled by rival political parties.
2. The tragedy of Gaza and the armed struggle between Hamas and Fatah
a) The sequence of events
Israel and Hamas concluded a six-month ceasefire on June 19, 2008. From that date until the end of October 2008, 38 rockets were fired into southern Israel. Hamas, which said it respected its commitment to the truce, claimed responsibility for the attacks. Contrary to the ceasefire agreement, Israel did not lift the blockade in place since June 2006.
On November 4, 2008 the Israeli army made an incursion into Palestinian territory. In retaliation Hamas fired rockets towards Israel. On December 14 Khaled Meshaal announced that the truce would not be renewed. Five days later Israel refused to lift the Gaza blockade. The rocket fire intensified, climaxing on December 26, 2008 when over 80 hit towns in south-central Israel.
On December 27 the Israeli government ordered the bombardment of Hamas installations in a large-scale military operation called "Cast Lead" by the Israelis and the "Black Saturday Massacre" by the Palestinians. The death toll in the first four days was 400.
Israeli officials maintained a blackout on information from the Gaza Strip and banned foreign journalists from entering it. Both parties waged a veritable war of information in the media and on the Internet. Shocked by what they saw on television, many people took to the streets in Arab cities and some Western capitals. Fatah militants and officials joined several Hamas demonstrations on the West Bank.
The already shaky humanitarian situation dramatically broke down. On January 8, 2009 the UN suspended all its activities in Gaza and warned the Israeli army after it bombarded one of its humanitarian convoys. A million people were deprived of electricity, 750,000 of running water. Hospitals were overcrowded and exhausted medical staffs lacked medicine.
On January 17, 2009, three days before Barack Obama took office, Israel and Hamas decreed unilateral ceasefires, which were never officialized but are still in force.
b) The scope of the tragedy
The Senate mission entered Gaza on January 29, 2009. It noted the destruction of the international American school, an UNWRA warehouse, Al Qods Hospital and the industrial area near the Karni checkpoint. The rapporteurs were surprised at the selectivity and precision of the Israel strikes, which systematically targeted infrastructure, including schools, hospitals and administrative buildings, causing a high number of civilian casualties. They were also shocked by the use of white phosphorus incendiary bombs on the UNWRA warehouse and Al Qods Hospital.
Al Qods Hospital Gaza seen from the rear after the Israeli bombardment
January 29, 2009
Senate Mission
Playroom of the Al Qods Hospital pediatric ward after being hit by a white phosphorus bomb
January 29, 2009
Senate Mission
UNWRA medicine warehouse in Gaza after an Israeli bombardment
January 29, 2009
Senate Mission
American international school in Beit Lahya - totally destroyed
January 29, 2009
Senate Mission
Surprisingly, the UN Security Council had no reaction to the shelling and destruction of UNWRA buildings.
c) The toll of operation "Cast Lead"
A Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) report dated March 12, 2009 put the death toll at 1,434, of which 82% were civilians. The Israeli foreign affairs ministry put its country's death toll at 13, including three civilians. Seven of the 10 soldiers died in friendly-fire incidents. So much for the casualties. What were the political repercussions of operation "Cast Lead"? Israel had not clearly stated its war aims but probably sought to achieve two military and political goals.
The only stated military objective was stop the rocket attacks. Israel achieved that goal, but the cost was a very high number of civilian Palestinian casualties.
The Israeli army also probably sought to restore its credibility, which had been shaken by the semi-failure of the last war in Lebanon in 2006, when it suffered many losses in the teeth of fierce resistance from Hezbollah.
Television pictures showing the Israeli forces' destructive effectiveness seem to have restored Israelis' confidence in its army.
But the impact on international opinion, shocked by the Israeli army's extreme brutality, was deeply negative.
Several NGOs, in particular Israeli ones, listed the violations of international humanitarian law committed by the Israeli army.
The UN Human Rights Council asked a fact-finding mission led by judge Richard Goldstone to investigate the accusations. On September 15, 2009 the mission handed in its findings, which concluded that the Israeli army's attacks on Gaza had been "a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate, and terrorize a civilian population, radically diminish its local economic capacity both to work and to provide for itself and to force upon it an ever-increasing sense of dependency and vulnerability.» 21 ( * ) .
The report also noted that "The continuum is evident most immediately with the policy of blockade that preceded the operations and that in the Mission's view amounts to collective punishment intentionally inflicted by the Government of Israel on the people of the Gaza Strip... These measures were imposed by the State of Israel purportedly to isolate and weaken Hamas after its electoral victory ..." It concluded that "the Gaza military operations were, according to the Israeli Government, thoroughly and extensively planned. While the Israeli Government has sought to portray its operations as essentially a response to rocket attacks in the exercise of its right to self defense, the Mission considers the plan to have been directed, at least in part, at a different target: the people of Gaza as a whole." 22 ( * )
Faced with Israeli firepower, outnumbered Hamas combatants deliberately refused to fight. Consequently, the operation only moderately damaged its military potential and political apparatus.
Politically, the main aim of the Kadima party's leader, Tzipi Livni, and her allies was to show that they were at least as determined as their right-wing rivals to implement an aggressive policy against Israel's enemies. Nevertheless, despite good electoral results Livni was unable to form a coalition government and eventually had to step aside so that her rival, Benyamin Netanyahou, could become prime minister.
The strategy of attempting to isolate Hamas from the rest of Gaza's population seems to have failed. Hamas is in firm control of Gaza, although it is unknown how popular it is.
"Cast Lead" increased the Palestinians' thirst for revenge against Israel. All of Arab opinion shares that view, which has strengthened the hostility of the "Arab street" against the West, considered Israel's accomplice.
On the whole, the operation left Hamas in a stronger position. In an "asymmetrical" conflict, it the weaker party merely survive it wins.
Hamas controls the Gaza Strip with an iron fist. It drapes itself in the flag of the resistance and Fatah is spent as a political force in Gaza. Its representation offices have been closed. Pressure on the movement's staff is growing on every level day by day. All demonstrations are banned. The blockade benefits Hamas, which collects taxes on trade through the tunnels in the Rafah area. Hamas is methodically working to Islamize society, indoctrinating children, pressuring women to wear the veil, ousting Palestinian Authority civil servants, etc. The Authority has met with fierce criticism, including on the West Bank, for having banned, under Fayyad's authority and in cooperation with Israeli officials, all demonstrations to support Gaza, deemed a threat to public order.
The gulf between the two Palestinian movements has never been wider.
d) What does Khaled Meshaal want?
The rapporteurs thought it was impossible to assess the situation without hearing the views of a key player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Hamas. They interviewed its political leader, Khaled Meshaal, in Damascus on January 20, 2009, the day after the ceasefire. The meeting took place without help from the French Embassy, which is not allowed to make contact with Hamas 23 ( * ) .
Meshaal said that all attempts to wipe out Hamas in Gaza by force had failed. The movement now has electoral as well as military legitimacy because it survived the test of strength Israel had imposed on it. Israel's failure also shows that despite its power it cannot defeat the Palestinians and that the only road to peace goes through the recognition of their rights.
Meshaal said Hamas accepts the prospect of a 10-year truce with Israel and does not rule out the possibility of a permanent ceasefire but demands first that it withdraw from the West Bank occupied territories and allows the creation of a Palestinian State.
He said the main issue blocking the designation of a good Palestinian interlocutor to conduct peace talks, in other words one who represents a national unity government, was the refusal to accept Hamas as an indispensable player on the Palestinian stage.
When asked about the possibility of amending the Hamas Charter and recognizing the State of Israel, Meshaal answered:
"What did Mahmoud Abbas and Yasser Arafat before him obtain in return for recognizing Israel and renouncing the PLO Covenant? Nothing.
"The Arabs made a generous peace offer in 2002 (Prince Abdallah of Saudi Arabia's "Arab peace initiative"). Did Israel respond? No. Even Hamas made a generous offer in 2006, when the Palestinian factions reached a consensus after the reconciliation.
"We implicitly agreed to recognize Israel within its 1967 borders as long as the rights of the Palestinians are recognized and they enjoy genuine sovereignty... Consequently, the recognition of Israel is not a problem... The solution is to make a Palestinian State possible, then to ask that State to recognize Israel."
3. The present standstill
a) Three deadlocks
The conflict of legitimacy : Hamas draws its legitimacy from the legislative elections and the Gaza tragedy. It possesses what Amin Maalouf calls "fighting legitimacy". Fatah controls the Palestinian Authority, the only organization whose legitimacy Israel and the international community recognize to conduct negotiations. New presidential and legislative elections should resolve the conflict of legitimacy, especially since blood has flowed between the two movements and the settling of scores has become commonplace.
The territorial division : Hamas controls Gaza. The price it paid to achieve that goal was too high to give it up without receiving very serious concessions in return. Despite appalling living conditions everything suggests that the population is primarily angry at Israel. Small extremist groups claiming allegiance to Al Qaeda have appeared. Fatah wields a semblance of power on the West Bank and controls the PLO. Giving that up would doom the organization to disappear, especially since Abbas obtained nothing substantial in exchange for cooperating with Israel. On the contrary, the Israeli army's incursions and "extrajudicial executions" in the West Bank undermine the Palestinian Authority's credibility. The deadlock does not stand in the way of the formation of a provisional government but it is an obstacle to the creation of a Palestinian State.
The third rift is political . Assuming both parties reach a compromise and form a unity government leaving each movement in control of its own territory, on what basis would they conduct negotiations and with what program? Should Hamas start by recognizing Israel, as Fatah did, or could that recognition come at the end of talks, as Hamas suggests?
b) The inter-Palestinian negotiations in Cairo
The "inter-Palestinian dialogue" began in Cairo on February 26 and lasted only a few days. A second meeting took place from March 10 to 20 to lay the groundwork for dialogue. Other sessions have been held. The talks seem to have come up against three stumbling blocks.
First, the program: Hamas wants the government to have a real political role, whereas Fatah would like it to focus on three missions--planning elections, rebuilding Gaza and establishing territorial unity.
Second, the debate remains open on the next government's need to "recognize" (the Mecca agreement's wording) or "endorse" (as Fatah demands) the PLO's commitments. All the participants acknowledge that asking Hamas to recognize Israel from the outset would be futile and that a better idea would be to foster the conditions for a resumption of talks.
Third, the overhaul of the security forces raises a problem. Each is determined to control the armed forces upon which its political survival depends.
Nevertheless, the parties reached agreement on two important points.
Elections: the Palestinians must elect a new president, legislative council and national council (the PLO's legislative body) by January 25, 2010. There is still disagreement on the voting method for the elections to the Palestinian National Council, to which Hamas does not belong.
PLO reform: the goal is to boost its representativeness both inside and outside. A new Palestinian National Council could be elected based on 100% proportional representation. Meanwhile, Hamas refuses to formally join the group in order to avoid having to recognize the PLO's current structures and gains.
The inter-Palestinian dialogue has produced no results as of the date the present report was written. For the negotiations to succeed it is necessary either for Hamas to agree to recognize Israel prior to any negotiation or for Israel to agree to negotiate with a Palestinian government including one or more members it does not recognize.
Those two conditions seem out of reach.
B. ISRAEL'S ACCEPTANCE, WITH CONDITIONS, OF A PALESTINIAN STATE
Israel has faced a dilemma since its creation: choose between a binational State within its present borders at the risk of dissolving the country's Jewish identity or accept a Palestinian State in return for giving back or exchanging settlement land and compromising its military security. Israel has never really chosen between the two and its governments seem to use negotiations as a stalling tactic.
1. Israel's dilemma
a) The solution of a binational State
The binational State would be a single entity encompassing Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, in which Jews and Arabs would have legal equality. That is the situation in the State of Israel today.
If all the Palestinian territories are absorbed into a single State, Arabs would swiftly become the majority of the population, jeopardizing Israel's Jewish identity.
The latest Israeli Statistics Office report puts Israel's population at 7,411,500: 75.5%, or 5,592,600, are Jews, including the 500,000 settlers living outside the 1967 borders, and 20.2%, or 1.5 million, are Israeli Arabs, mostly Muslims but also Christians. In addition, 321,000 immigrants are registered with the Interior Ministry as "non-Jewish". The count does not include the approximately 150,000 foreign workers living in Israel.
In a binational State covering the territory of historic Palestine, 1.5 million Gaza Strip residents as well as 2.3 million West Bank and East Jerusalem inhabitants would join the Israeli Arabs to form a total Palestinian population of 5.5 million.
In those conditions, it is understandable that the overwhelming majority of the Jewish population, attached to the Jewish character of the State created in 1948, rejects the prospect of a binational entity 24 ( * ) .
In this regard, UN resolution 181 of November 29 1947 uses the terms "Jewish State" to refer to Israel and "Arab State" for the Palestinian entity several times. From the outset, Israel has been a State whose reason for existing is to be a safe haven for the Jewish people.
b) The two-State solution
The other solution would be two States within the post-1967 borders, which would give 78% of historic Palestine's territory to Israel 25 ( * ) . The problem is that since the Six Day War every Israeli government has let many settlers move onto land outside the 1967 borders, to territories internationally recognized as Palestinian, except the Gaza Strip, which Ariel Sharon evacuated in 2005 with approval from the Knesset.
|
Israeli settler population |
|||
|
West Bank |
East Jerusalem |
Total |
|
|
1972 |
1 182 |
8 649 |
9 831 |
|
1993 |
111 600 |
152 800 |
264 400 |
|
2000 |
192 976 |
172 250 |
365 226 |
|
2003 |
224 669 |
178 601 |
403 270 |
|
2006 |
268 400 |
186 857 |
455 257 |
|
2007 |
282 000 |
190 000 |
472 000 |
Source : Central bureau of statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel
In addition to the expansion of the settlements themselves, infrastructure, in particular roads reserved for settlers connecting them to one another and 600 checkpoints intended to control the Palestinians' movements, is growing. Settlements and roads dislodge Palestinians from their land and make their living conditions unbearable. Economic growth of the interior "archipelago" 26 ( * ) the Palestinian territories form today is impossible in those conditions. Israel has never wanted or been able to choose between the two solutions.
2. The lesser of two evils for Israel
The definition of a dilemma is that no solution is satisfactory. From that viewpoint, the acceptance of a Palestinian State raises the thorny issue of the status of Jerusalem and the settlements. Their expansion on the West Bank is an obstacle to the creation of a territorially coherent and politically independent Palestinian State, which, however, would be the lesser of two evils for both parties.
a) Israel's long-term interests
Only the two-State solution would finally give the Palestinian people their independence and dignity and offer Israelis the promise of living in security within internationally recognized borders.
It is not in the Israelis' long-term interest to live surrounded by hostile peoples and to turn their backs on the region where they chose to establish their homeland, locked behind walls they built in fear of suicide attacks or deadly uprisings.
Is it in the United Status's and Europe's interest to refuse to let the Palestinian people have the State to which they legitimately aspire and to be hated because of that by 300 million Arabs and a billion Muslims?
b) The Israelis' choice
Everything suggests that Israeli citizens are ready to accept the two-State solution. Many polls show that a big majority rejects the binational State solution but accepts the prospect of two States. According to a Onevoice survey conducted on April 22, 2009 27 ( * ) , 78% lean in favor of a two-State solution compared to 74% in 2007.
|
Percentage of Israelis |
Essential |
Desirable |
Acceptable |
Tolerable |
Unacceptable |
|
A shared State: a binational federal State in which Israelis and Palestinians share power |
7 |
6 |
11 |
8 |
66 |
|
The two-State solution: two States for two peoples, Israel and Palestine |
32 |
13 |
16 |
17 |
21 |
|
A political statu quo with economic development in Palestine/the West Bank/Gaza |
27 |
18 |
12 |
14 |
24 |
|
A confederation betwen the West Bank and Jordan and between Gaza and Egypt |
19 |
20 |
15 |
17 |
21 |
|
A Jewish State from the Jordanian border to the sea |
17 |
10 |
11 |
8 |
47 |
|
When the total of percentages does not reach 100, it means the rest "did not answer" |
|||||
c) The feasibility of an agreement
The two-State solution's parameters are known. They were the focus of long negotiations under the aegis of President Clinton and, later, during the Annapolis process, which officialized the "solution of two separate States" for the first time in the joint declaration of all the parties.
The solutions were not that different from the "parameters" President Clinton listed in his December 23, 2000 peace plan. Here are the main points.
1. Land: President Clinton concluded that 94 to 96% of Israeli-occupied territories should be handed over to the Palestinians. Israel should also give the Palestinians an equivalent amount of land in exchange for keeping territory where its settlements lie.
2. Security : Israeli forces would remain stationed in fixed positions in the Jordan Valley for 36 months under the monitoring of an international force. That period could be shortened if the situation allowed. Three Israeli early-warning bases would remain on the West Bank according to terms renegotiable every 10 years. The Palestinian State would have had full sovereignty over its airspace, but the two parties were asked to conclude agreements allowing Israeli forces to train there. The Israelis had suggested calling the future country a "demilitarized State" and the Palestinians "a State with armament". President Clinton had proposed calling it a "non-militarized State". It was also foreseen that an international force would be in charge of border security.
3. Jerusalem: President Clinton proposed assigning Arab-populated areas to the Palestinian State and predominantly Jewish ones to Israel 28 ( * ) .
4. Refugees: the Palestinians would have the right to settle in a Palestinian State but Israel could admit only a limited number of refugees.
5. The end of the conflict: signing the accord would necessarily end the conflict and application of UN resolutions 242 and 338 would be concluded by the release of prisoners.
The rapporteurs questioned the Palestinian Saeb Erekat, who was a negotiator when the Clinton parameters were discussed. Here is what he said:
"We had no negotiations at all between 2000 and 2007. We had contacts on checkpoints and settler activity but that's all. We only talked about day-to-day issues.
"And then there was Annapolis in 2007. That was the first time our prime ministers (Olmert and Abbas) sat down at the same table and talked. There were around 100 hours of negotiations. Did that lead to an agreement? No. Did we really negotiate deeply? Yes. Did we shatter taboos and cross lines? Yes. The talks reached a point where there was no longer any need to negotiate, just to decide. The decision did not come.
"The negotiations took the 1967 borders as their basis, including Jerusalem and the Dead Sea. We kept the idea of exchanging land. We included wording on how Europe could play an effective role in maintaining regional security.
"We Palestinians wrote those ideas down on a piece of paper and asked the Israelis 'do you agree?' But the Israelis failed to stop the growth of settlements, in particular the three main ones: Ariel, Gush Etzion and Ma'ale Adumin. Israel wanted us to accept facts on the ground. That was not possible.
"There will be a decision at the end of the negotiations. But what determines whether or not the agreement lasts is its balanced character and fairness."
If the Palestinians, the other Arab countries and the international community want a two-State solution, and the majority of the Israeli know all its details and accept it, why delay the decision?
3. Stalling as strategy
The rapporteurs had the sense that Israeli administrations use any pretext, good or bad, to stall for time and postpone decisions. Three factors may explain their nearly congenital inability to make choices that would lead to a "just and lasting" peace with the Palestinians.
a) Israel's security
According to most polls, in particular those conducted by the Onevoice movement, security is what matters most to Israelis.
|
Priority in
|
Percentage of Palestinians |
Considered
|
Percentage of Israelis |
Considered
|
|
1 |
A sovereign independent State of Palestine |
97 |
Security for Israel |
77 |
|
2 |
The refugees' right of return |
95 |
Agreement on Jerusalem's future |
68 |
|
3 |
Agreement on Jerusalem's future |
94 |
Right to natural resources |
62 |
|
4 |
Agreement on managing the holy places |
91 |
Agreement on managing the holy places |
57 |
|
5 |
Security for Palestine |
90 |
Agreement on borders |
49 |
|
6 |
Settlements on the West Bank and in the occupied territories |
89 |
Peace between Israel and Jordan |
47 |
|
7 |
Rights to natural resources |
88 |
Peace between Israel and Egypt |
46 |
|
8 |
Agreements on the borders between Israel and Palestine |
77 |
Peace between Israel and the Arab world |
37 |
|
9 |
Peace between Israel and the Arab world |
35 |
Peace between Israel and Lebanon |
36 |
|
10 |
Peace between Israel and Lebanon |
31 |
Peace between Israel and Syria |
36 |
|
11 |
Peace between Israel and Syria |
30 |
A sovereign independant State of Palestine |
33 |
|
12 |
Security for Israel |
21 |
Agreement on managing the holy places |
33 |
|
13 |
Peace between Israel and Jordan |
Peace between Israel and Iran |
29 |
|
|
14 |
Peace between Israel and Egypt |
Refugees' rights |
25 |
|
|
15 |
Peace between Israel and Iran |
Security for Palestine |
23 |
However, Israel enjoys almost total security because the strength of its army dissuades potential enemies.
The Israeli army has overwhelming superiority in the region. That is not just a matter of military equipment, organization or training but also of strategy, which is based on the thought of Israel's founder, Ben Gurion 29 ( * ) , who said the country's army must be superior to the total of all the armies capable of threatening it. To achieve that goal, he added, Israel must have the best possible intelligence in order to benefit from early warning because it cannot afford to be taken by surprise. That is the role of Mossad and the air force. Israel must also have the capacity to dissuade its enemies from attacking. 30 ( * ) Lastly, in the event of war it must win a decisive victory as swiftly as possible. Those principles ensure Israel's military supremacy at least as much as the value of its weaponry. The result is that no Arab State, not even the most radical, can consider attacking Israel. All are in defensive postures.
In contrast, Israel's traditional strategy towards asymmetrical conflicts has proven ineffective, in particular during the last intervention in Lebanon, when some Israeli think tanks said that Israeli forces are "strategically inferior" to Hezbollah or Hamas and proposed a shift in military doctrine. One goals of operation "Cast Lead" was to make an appropriate response to asymmetrical confrontations. The idea was simple: the Israelis would restore its capacity to dissuade non-State attacks by ruthlessly responding to the slightest assault no matter what the cost in civilian casualties and infrastructure.
That tactic proved effective in the 19 th century when it was used by Europe's colonial armies and by the US army when conquering the West. Israel's security is guaranteed. In 2008, 35 Israelis were victims of political violence, including 23 civilians31 ( * ). Hamas abandoned suicide attacks in April 2006 and the last action for which it claimed responsibility dates back to January 2005. Four Israelis, three of them soldiers, have been killed since the beginning of 2009. In contrast, the Palestinian population has paid a heavy price in recent years.
That does not mean Israeli citizens are not in danger, but that Israel has never been safer. Consequently, the need to negotiate and make concessions is not as strong.
b) The weakness of Israel's political system
Israeli elections are based on full proportional representation, which leads to the fragmentation of political forces into a host of parties forced into coalitions. The prime minister is always his allies' hostage. Many linchpin parties have radical, if not extremist, positions. Full proportional representation gives their deputies the power of life or death over any government. Few prime ministers have been able to finish their terms without holding early elections. The prospect of frequent elections makes it impossible for any democracy to craft a long-term strategy. In such a system, any Israeli prime minister intent on making the concessions necessary for the conclusion of peace jeopardizes his or her government. That is why none has ever really tried to stop settlements, even though settlers account for just 8% of the population.
The settlements have grown fastest under Ehud Olmert's government, sworn in on 14 April 2006. The NGO Peace Now says that building in West Bank and «unauthorized» settlements grew by 60% in 2008, the year of the Annapolis accord, which called for a settlement freeze. Peace Now also says settlers took advantage of the Gaza War, which captured public attention, to expand settlements and build new roads between them.
«Unauthorized» settlements, as opposed to settlements «authorized» by Israeli officials, are technically illegal. International law, in particular the United Nations Charter and article 47-4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, forbids annexation, which applies to all settlements, even if they are «authorized».
If Israel's security is guaranteed, and if it would be suicidal for governments to make the concessions necessary for the conclusion of an accord, what would be the incentive for the Israelis to return to the negotiating table?
c) The unshakeable relationship with the United States
1. George W. Bush's policy
The relationship between Israel and the United States never seemed as close as it did under George W. Bush, who almost automatically aligned his policy with Israel's positions and sent it massive amounts of military equipment.
Israel consistently receives more US military aid than any other country in the world: an average of $1.8 billion a year since 1987 in funding and equipment sales. That amount rose to $2.4 billion under the Clinton administration. In 2007 the United States increased its aid to Israel by 25% to $3 billion a year for the following decade. In addition, George W. Bush assured Prime Minister Olmert that the United States would guarantee that the equipment delivered to Israel would have a qualitative edge over that sold to the other countries in the Middle East 32 ( * ) .
The U.S. Congressional Research Service says that between 1998 and 2005 United States contracts worth over $9.5 billion provided the Israeli army with almost all its supplies. Although the government's agreement is necessary for weapons exports, Israel deals directly with American companies for its supplies. It has the world's biggest F-16 fleet outside the United States.
The Bush administration backed up its military help with unfailing diplomatic support, which probably had as much to do with the pro-Israeli lobby's activism 33 ( * ) as with the convictions of certain neoconservatives close to the US president.
2. New US policy
President Obama's heartfelt, inspiring and important Cairo speech on June 4, 2009 shows he has broken with his predecessor and shifted course in the Middle East. Actions may speak louder than words, but in the Middle East words matter.
From the viewpoint of US domestic policy the new administration's position seems courageous because 78% of American Jews voted for Obama. US support for Israel is becoming more critical while remaining "unshakeable". President Obama has asked the Israeli government to recognize the need for a Palestinian State and to freeze new settlement growth.
The Israeli prime minister changed his position and reluctantly agreed to the creation of a Palestinian State, but only in return for the Palestinians' recognition of Israel's Jewish character, the demilitarization of their future State and the international community's guarantee of Israel's security. As a token of goodwill he had a few unauthorized settlements evacuated and lifted some barriers on the West Bank, but rejected a «total» settlement freeze and demanded the right of «natural growth» of authorized settlements.
Benyamin Netanyahu is a skillful politician but it is probably not in his country's interest to humiliate the United States president by dodging the issues.
Experience shows that a US president can exert decisive influence on the Israeli government if he really wants to. The new US policy, because it is relatively more balanced, undeniably opens up fresh prospects in a situation that seemed totally deadlocked.
C. THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACE
1. How to help reunify the Palestinian movement
One of the main stumbling blocks on the road to reconciliation is Israel's and the international community's rejection of all contact with Hamas and refusal to grant it any international aid.
The Western powers would like to help rebuild the Gaza Strip under the Palestinian Authority's exclusive aegis, which Hamas can obviously not accept. At the March 2, 2009 Sharm el-Sheikh summit they agreed to pay $2.8 billion to rebuild Gaza. But no reconstruction can take place until Israeli lifts its blockade. Imported building materials, spare parts and agricultural inputs are indispensable. In April 2009, four months after the end of hostilities, Gaza imports were at their lowest level since the start of the year despite tremendous humanitarian needs and the cessation of rocket attacks.
The problem is not just humanitarian, although lifting the blockade is imperative from that point of view. It is above all political. Why does Israel refuse to negotiate with a Hamas-led government and why has it talked the United States and Europe into not speaking to Hamas? 34 ( * )
Hamas is undoubtedly a terrorist organization and Israel's foe. But one makes peace with one's enemies, not with one's friends. France agreed to speak to the F.L.N. and the British government to the IRA.
A House of Commons report published on August 13, 2007 said «We conclude that the decision not to speak to Hamas in 2007 following the Mecca agreement was counterproductive» and that «the decision to boycott Hamas despite the Mecca agreement and the continued suspension of aid to the national unity government meant that this government was highly likely to collapse". 35 ( * ) Our British colleagues have just reiterated their recommendation to speak with Hamas moderates in a recent report on the situation in Israel and the occupied territories 36 ( * ) . In the same vein, former US president Jimmy Carter met «Prime Minister» Ismail Haniyeh on a visit to the Gaza Strip on June 19, 2009.
Let us not be fooled. According to information supplied to the rapporteurs by Turkish officials, the Israelis have secret contacts with Hamas. Forbidding the Europeans and Americans from doing as much would push Hamas into the arms of Iran.
The Quartet's current demands are an obstacle to the formation of a Palestinian unity government. Israel's existence will be implicitly recognized if Hamas participates in a government of national unity that enters into negotiations with it. De jure recognition would come at the end of the talks, but between two sovereign entities. Requiring Hamas to recognize Israel beforehand would have only one consequence: preventing the peace process from starting.
The Israelis continue to view Hamas's Charter as proof of an Islamic «worldview» incompatible with Western values and principles, but many researchers 37 ( * ) have shown that the document is above all a card in Hamas's deck that it will discard when the time comes.
During the 2006 elections Hamas presented an «electoral platform» and, later, a bigger «national unity government program», to situate its position with regard to the 1988 Charter. They stressed "freedom of expression, of the press, of association", "pluralism", "separation of powers", the "peaceful alternation of power", the "construction of a developed civil society" and "respect for the rights of minorities".
If anything is demanded prior to talks with Hamas, it should be the respect of those principles and values in Gaza more than the amendment of a charter a group of hotheaded students wrote over 20 years ago to which Hamas leaders themselves do not seem to attach the slightest importance.
It seems increasingly clear that Abbas is postponing PLO reform until better days. The same goes for the reform of Fatah, which is nevertheless indispensable before the next elections because conservatives and the «young guard», which no longer rules out a return to armed struggle, are pulling it in opposite directions 38 ( * ) .
The summer of 2009 Fatah congress may have restored Abbas's legitimacy and breathed new life into the movement but did not settle the core issue: reunification of the Palestinian movement.
The Israeli government probably holds the key to Palestinian reunification in the person of a jailed Fatah member whose representativeness is recognized by Hamas: Marwan Barghouti.
According to information the rapporteurs gathered from Barghouti's wife, the lawyer Fadwa Barghouti, his incarceration conditions are harsh, which has not prevented him from being recognized as a leader by all his fellow inmates, who have come out in favor of national unity with him.
The Palestinians would probably close ranks if Barghouti formed a national unity government. To him, reconciliation depends on implementing the «prisoners' document» all the factions endorsed, which guarantees the protection of democratic principles: pluralism, the separation of powers, civil rights and public freedoms. It proclaims the Palestinian people's right to resistance and spells out the specific steps for restoring unity: reform of the PLO and of the Palestinian Authority, both organs being mandated to uphold and defend the Palestinian people's demands in negotiations with Israel. The national unity government alone would be in charge of rebuilding Gaza and holding elections by January 25, 2010.
In those conditions, it is worth considering exchanging Barghouti for Gilad Shalit, especially since, according to his wife Fadwa, he tops the list of prisoners presented to Israel in exchange for the Israeli soldier's release.
|
Marwan Barghouti Barghouti was one of the first Intifada's main political leaders in the Gaza Strip in 1987, when the Israeli army arrested him and expelled him to Jordan. He was unable to return until after the Oslo accords were signed in 1994. Two years later Barghouti was elected to the Palestine Legislative Council, where he defended the need for peace with Israel. A talented speaker who proved himself in combat, Barghouti climbed the rungs of Fatah's political ladder, becoming secretary-general for the West Bank. Barghouti headed Fatah's armed wing, Tanzim-Fatah, during the second Intifada, when his organizing skills made him indispensable. His popularity rose among the Palestinians. Meanwhile, Tanzim-Fatah launched suicide attacks on Israeli soil and settlements through the intermediary of a group, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Barghouti's role in suicide attacks against Israel made him one of the Israeli security forces' most wanted Palestinians. In 2001 he foiled an Israeli attempt on his life. Israel captured him on April 15, 2002. A civilian court indicted him on several counts of murder and attempted murder in a terrorist enterprise under his command. Israeli military tribunals usually try Palestinians captured for acts of resistance but for Barghouti Israel had to bow to international pressure and provide a minimum of legal credibility at the trial. Barghouti used the trial as a soapbox to plead his political cause. Throughout the trial he refused to recognize the Israeli court's legitimacy and, therefore, to defend himself. He said he supported armed attacks against the Israeli occupation but not on civilians within Israel. On May 20, 2004 the court sentenced Barghouti for five murders, including of a Greek Orthodox monk. It also found him guilty of attempted murder for a suicide attack foiled by the Israeli security forces. Barghouti pleaded innocent to 21 counts of murder committed during 33 attacks. On June 6 the court sentenced him to five life sentences for five murders and 40 years in prison for attempted murder. |
2. How can the Israelis be helped to understand that a viable Palestinian State is in their interests?
Paradoxically, Israel is politically too weak to make peace and militarily too strong to need it. In addition, until now its army and government have enjoyed unconditional backing from the United States.
Israel's security is a legitimate concern and any peace project must include measures to address it. But the current insecurity must be put into perspective and correctly understood. The fact of the matter is that today Israel enjoys a very high level of security and a high standard of living, while the populations of Gaza and the West Bank are living in poverty and insecurity due to the military occupation and settlement activity. The Gaza blockade has dragged on for three years and the checkpoints are still in place, although their number has been recently reduced.
Meanwhile, Palestinian leaders do not seem ready for reconciliation. The gulf between them is wide and it does not look as though they are willing to agree on a negotiations program, especially if recognition of Israel is a prior condition.
In that context Palestinian reconciliation would be a miracle. It will take more than the goodwill of Egyptian officials to get there.
The Western powers bear a big share of the responsibility for this situation. They insisted on free elections, helped organize them, recognized their validity and then, after the results were announced, refused to recognize the government that emerged from the voting. Under pressure from Israel they still refuse to dialogue with Hamas. It is easy to understand the reasons for that attitude, which is nevertheless a mistake that should be corrected.
One thing is clear. Israelis and Palestinians will not make peace without an honest broker capable of restoring a minimum of balance between the parties. For obvious reasons, the United States is the only country capable of meeting that challenge. The European Union can help if it stops bankrolling the Palestinian Authority, which would put the financial burden on Israel as an occupying power.
* 14 On this point see Amin Maalouf in " Le dérèglement du Monde" - Grasset, 2009, in particular the chapter entitled "Les légitimités égarées".
* 15 On this issue see Charles Enderlin, " Quand Israël favorisait le Hamas", Le Monde, 4 February 2009.
* 16 Voir annexe 2
* 17 See Henry Laurens, interview with the JDD, 9 January 2009 entitled "Abbas n'a rien apporté".
* 18 Above-mentioned interview
* 19 See appendix 2
* 20 Article 121 of the Palestinian Constitution of 26 March 2003 states that "after consultations with the representative parties, the President shall name the Prime Minister from the party that obtained the largest number of seats in the House of Representatives."
* 21 Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories - Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza conflict - Human Rights Council - Twelfth session - Agenda item 7 - advance edited version p. 525 item 1690.
* 22 Report mentioned above, p. 521 item 1675 and p. 523 item 1680
* 23 See the complete interview in appendix 4.
* 24 See appendix 6: Israel's political system and the proclamation of independence.
* 25 See map in appendix
* 26 See map in appendix 5
* 27 "Israel and Palestine: Public Opinion, Public Diplomacy and Peace Making"; available on the Internet: http://www.onevoicemovement.org/programs/polling_contents.php
* 28 This parameter is no longer relevant in 2009 because Arab quarters have shrunk due to settlements, Jewish families have moved in and many Palestinian homes have been destroyed.
* 29 This idea was presented to us by Gridi Grinstein, director of the Reut Institute, an independent think tank, and advisor to the government on strategic decisions.
* 30 According to the Center for Strategic & International Studies' recent "Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran's Nuclear Development Facilities" - Washington - Abdullah Toukan & Anthony H. Cordesman - March 14, 2009, Israel might have 200 or more nuclear warheads.
* 31 Source: Israeli foreign affairs minister.
* 32 Le Figaro.fr, 29 July 2007
* 33 See the book by J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007) and its critique by Anti-Defamation League leader Abraham Foxman, whom the rapporteurs met in New York: The Deadliest Lies: The Israel Lobby and the Myth of Jewish Control .
* 34 The members of the Israeli government, as well as Benyamin Netanyahu, who was then a candidate, refused to meet the rapporteurs during their trip to Israel because they had met Khaled Mechaal in Damascus Only Haim Oron, leader of Meretz, agreed to see them.
* 35 House of Commons - Foreign Affairs Committee - Global Security ; the Middle East - Eighth Report of Sessions 2006-07; quotes p. 2 (item 3) and p. 28 (item 50).
* 36 House of Commons - Foreign Affairs Committee - Global Security : Israël and the Occupied Palestinian Territories - Fifth Report of Sessions 2008-09 ; p. 5 (item 12) policy towards Hamas.
* 37 See Paul Delmotte: «Le Hamas et la reconnaissance d'Israël - impasse politique en Palestine» Le Monde diplomatique, January 2007.
* 38 International Herald Tribune - May 21, 2009: «Fatah struggles with a new guard's call for change».