APPENDIX 3 - Map of the Gaza Strip
APPENDIX 4 - Interview between
the French Senate mission and
Khaled Meshaal - political leader of Hamas
, Damascus, January 20,
2009 -
KHALED MECHAAL, JANUARY 20, 2009
We appreciate the position of the French people. We hope that the official French position will espouse these popular feelings as well as France's history of resistance (his reference was to the 2 nd world war).
We are angry at Ban Ki Moon's words in Sharm al-Shaykh. We are angry at the European leaders too. They gave vague promises to the Palestinians and firm commitments to the Israelis.
Now, why did the war start? This was not a war, in the conventional sense; it was a one-sided offensive. Israel expected to respect a cease-fire with no quid pro quo in terms of lifting the siege and opening the crossings. The common view in the street opposes this. This was both an Israeli and an Egyptian mistake. When the cease-fire expired, we received no offer to prolong it, from neither party. Our position was not to renew it without the opening of the borders. Unfortunately, some regional forces gave a cover to this aggression, as if it was in the common interest of these parties, the US and Israel to finish off Hamas. We believe that this collusion aimed at deposing Hamas, as a gift to the incoming administration. The PA in particular had realized it could not depose Hamas through stoking insecurity or imposing the siege, leaving Israeli tanks as its only recourse.
We weren't surprised by the attack in itself. Israel made no secret of it. We were well prepared. Moreover we own the land, and we own a just cause. We were the victimized; we didn't choose this war. Thanks to all this, we stood fast. But obviously we were shocked by the dimensions of the crimes committed by Israel against the civilians. Out of 1300 victims, half were women and children. They destroyed more than 20 mosques, along with schools, hospitals, ambulances, etc. Israeli officials deserve to be subjected to the same kind of justice as in the case of Serbia.
Hamas clearly won this war. We have endured great losses from a humanitarian perspective. But we have lost only 48 fighters from Hamas. Whoever hears these figures can only be surprised. But that's a fact. We didn't enter a conventional war against Israel; this was a guerrilla war. We were well prepared and fighting underground. The Israeli press itself stated Hamas was an army of ghosts. Did Israel capture any soldiers? No. (He also restated the story according to which Hamas captured 3 Israelis, immediately bombarded by Israel to deprive Hamas of a victory). The resistance fought in a legendary way. Israel fulfilled none of its stated goals: it didn't depose Hamas or weaken the resistance, nor did it stop the rocket fire. Just follow the internal Israeli debate and you will understand who won this war.
The war has led to two major results. All parties, be they regional or international, tried their best to depose Hamas. They tried out all options, and they failed. The first important result is that the way to deal with Hamas should therefore be different, based on respect and recognition for its role and legitimacy. Hamas earned its legitimacy first as a national movement, second through elections and finally by resisting the latest Israeli onslaught. Without this new approach, there will be no peace in the region.
The second lesson is that Israeli simply cannot defeat the Palestinian people. Despite all its might, it cannot impose its conditions upon the Palestinians. Peacemaking will inevitably imply acknowledging the Palestinian national rights. Force is not the way to secure Israel.
Therefore this is the role we expect from Europe. The US failed, and Europe can fill the resulting vacuum and put pressure on the next administration. Europe and the US, all together, can then exert pressure on Israel. Israel must be told: «the only option left to you is peace via recognition of the Palestinian national rights».
(Responding to a question on the embarrassing silence in the West Bank)
You're right in being surprised. But this question is for Abu Mazen and Salam Fayadh to answer. They prevented all rallies. They detained 100s of leaders in the West Bank. For the past year and half, there has been a close cooperation between the PA and Israel to strangle the West Bank. It is exhausted. 11 000 prisoners hailing from the West Bank only are held in Israeli jails, and many of them are Hamas leaders and other public figures, that is the elite needed to mobilize the people. This explains the weakness of their stance.
(On Hizbollah)
Hizbollah did a good job in terms of public relations. But its military options were limited. International forces are deployed in the South, making it difficult for Hizbollah to open another front.
(Responding to a remark on the many questions the guests wanted to ask)
You have a lot of questions, and we have o lot of answers!
(On the rationale behind the ceasefire and reports of Syrian/Turkish pressure)
This information is false. Before the assault ended, intense talks were taking place, involving the Egyptians, the Syrians, the Turks, even the French. We sent our delegation out to Cairo as much as four times. Unfortunately, no indirect agreement was reached between Hamas and Israel. Why? The Egyptians imposed three conditions, although it attributed them to Israel. One was a permanent rather than a temporary ceasefire. They referred to a ceasefire of 10 to 15 years! We refused because this means putting an end to resistance. When Israel withdraws from all occupied territories, gives us our rights and allows the formation of a Palestinian State, then we can talk of a permanent ceasefire. The second condition was a written commitment by Hamas not to smuggle in weapons. We see the issue of weapon smuggling as the responsibility of States, mainly Egypt and Israel; we are a resistance movement. The third condition was that Rafah would be opened on the basis of the 2005 agreement. We reject that. The said agreement expired. It was signed before Hamas took office; there are new realities on the ground in Gaza nowadays. In response, we sent a proposal to the Egyptians stating what four parties may agree upon (Egypt, the Hamas government, the Palestinian presidency and European monitors). Egypt rejected the proposal, because it refuses to give Hamas any role at the crossing.
Basically, the Egyptian attitude toward Hamas just adds to the Israeli aggression.
Egypt was pressurizing us in Cairo; Israel was pressurizing us, militarily, in Gaza. When things stalled in Cairo, Israel intensified the pressure in Gaza. As a result, there really was no need for Syrian or Turkish pressure.
(Responding to a question on what Hamas would do if the Israelis didn't withdraw in due time).
They are out already. They started this morning and have completed the withdrawal. They had no other option.
(Responding to a question on what would happen if the blockade remained and the crossing didn't open)
During the war we expressed four demands: 1. Ceasefire; 2. Withdrawal; 3. Lifting the siege; 4. Opening the crossings. We fulfilled two objectives. Remain two. In that sense, we are still in this war. I think that the world heard the message that the siege led to the war, and must now be lifted. Otherwise, we the Palestinian people retain our options, and no stabilisation will occur in the region.
All Arab channels state that the people in Gaza blame Israel above all, then the Arabs, and finally the international community.
(Responding to a question on what Kuwait changes)
We were all surprised by King Abdallah's speech. We welcomed it and I called Saud al-Faysal and Migrin Ibn Abdul Aziz to express our appreciation. Yesterday, yes there was some degree of reconciliation. But from what I hear today, this reconciliation doesn't reflect in the different parties' respective positions. The final statement avoided touching upon the contentious issues. Some leaders didn't even attend the final meeting.
(Responding to a question on who might be a good partner in terms of Palestinian reconciliation).
Those who take decisions within Fatah and the PLO are those pushing a bad agenda. We see the PLO as having been in collusion with Israel during this war. Their attitudes may change. But the key is to respect Hamas as a central player in the Palestinian arena, and abide by the rules of Palestinian democracy.
(On the gift their charter and rejection of Israel offers their detractors).
This is a good question, and I will give you a good answer. One way of putting the debate is «what did Mahmud Abbas or Yasser Arafat before him gain from recognising Israel and renouncing the equivalent of the charter? Nothing. The Arabs took a generous initiative in 2002. Did Israel respond? No. Another way of putting the debate is the following: Hamas itself made a generous proposal in 2006, when we achieved a consensus among Palestinian factions toward achieving reconciliation. The document mentioned that we accept Israel within the border of 1967, obviously as long as Palestinian national rights are recognised and that Palestinians enjoy real sovereignty. This was endorsed by all, and represented a new position for Hamas. Recognition of Israel, therefore, is not the problem. Besides, it is wrong to ask those living in the jail of occupation to recognise the jailer. The solution is to empower the Palestinians to set up their State and then request that State to recognise Israel.
(Responding to a question on the role to be expected from the French and Europeans)
Israel is like an individual that is used to obtain by force what it wants from another individual. This can change only if the latter stands up to the former, or if a third party intervenes. Because of the Arab and Palestinian weakness, and because the US has not assumed its role, this is not happening.
We believe in a possible European role, because Europeans have a better understanding of the causes behind this conflict; because the failed US policies create a vacuum that needs to be filled; and because of the latest Israeli failure in using force and force only. France along with other Europeans may help reframe Western policies toward the region. For the pas 20 years, the US has pursued peace in a particular way, and it failed; continuing the same failed policy will lead to the same results.
(Responding to a question on whether the framework negotiated at the end of the Clinton era, and which appears to all as the only practical way to resolve this conflict, is acceptable to Hamas)
No. And it is not only unacceptable to Hamas. It is to Fatah too. This framework disregards the Palestinian national rights. Let me put it this way. The frame of reference in those negotiations was the international resolutions related to the conflict. Now when one negotiates on the basis of such a frame of reference, why try to manipulate or transform it? The day you accept to disparage the frame of reference, you open the door to all kinds of problems, simply because Israel is the strongest party. You end up with land swaps at Israel's discretion, an intractable situation in Jerusalem, ideas such as distinguishing who has sovereignty below and above earth near the Dome of the Rock. In practice, there is no fixed frame of reference, and because of this it is up to the strongest party to impose its terms. Israel will never give anything up unless it comes under pressure, either by the international community, or from Hamas.