II. THE RETURN OF RELIGION: A HARDENING IDENTITY
A. THE REJECTION OF WESTERN NORMS
Islam has once again become the dominant social norm of Middle East societies long tempted by Occidentalism. That is nothing new but dates back to the defeat of Arab nationalism in the 1967 Six Day War. The hallmarks of "re-Islamization" include the adoption of a dress code (the veil for women) and Islamic behavior intended to make one more respectable. Believers pray more conspicuously and everybody fasts during Ramadan or pretends to. All that has to do with the rejection of Western ways and a hardening of Muslim identity 5 ( * ) .
Religious beliefs, passed down from one generation to the next, fade away more slowly than ideologies. Religion comforts all the generations Israel defeated and humiliated by offering believers an identity to cling to.
Islam, the last sanctuary of their self-esteem, has gradually restored Muslims' dignity. Former nationalists have used religion to channel young people's anger and restore their pride 6 ( * ) .
B. THREE GENERATIONS OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
Modern Islamic fundamentalism has gone through three successive generations. The first, that of resistance to the colonial presence, has been replaced by the generation of resistance to the nationalist elites that took power after independence. The third generation, that of Al Qaeda, has set itself apart from the Islamic nationalism specific to occupied territories or countries at war with the West: Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and of course Palestine 7 ( * ) .
C. JIHADISM AND SALAFISM
Some members of the latest generation have opted for a radical interpretation and a warlike use of Muslim texts against the West in general, the United States and Israel in particular. They advocate a fight to the death not only against Christians and Jews, but also the "secular" elites in power in Muslim countries. The movement sets itself apart from the Muslim Brotherhood, which it accuses of making concessions intolerable to the primacy of the divine norm by accepting the principles of democracy.
D. TOWARDS A MUSLIM MODERNITY?
The hardening of identity is not necessarily a brake on modernization. A Muslim can be a doctor or an engineer and a fervent believer at the same time. In the 18 th century Pascal was a great mathematician, a mystic and a militant Jansenist. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan is a characteristic example. In a few years the movement has shifted away from the goal of a deep transformation society to a more conventional political struggle. It has officially abandoned the aim of setting up a theocratic State and the new guard proclaims its respect for popular sovereignty, democratic elections and minorities' rights. A loose conglomeration, the movement started in Egypt and has spread in various forms to many Middle East States, including Palestine and Jordan, where, as in Egypt, it campaigns for constitutional reforms, the independence of parliament, abolition of elections on a majority basis, liberal economic reforms and freedom of expression.
Is the Muslim Brotherhood a kind of Islamic "Christian democracy"? Are democratic demands compatible with its moralizing, preaching, calling people to religious practice, observing Islamic customs and tradition and criticizing broadcasts or publications considered immoral? By joining such movements, can the Middle East's peoples find an escape valve for their frustrations and, through a known dialectical phenomenon, embrace an original modernity rooted in their history?
* 5 See Amin Maalouf - Les identités meurtrières - Grasset 1998.
* 6 See Amin Maalouf - Le dérèglement du monde - Grasset 2009.
* 7 See Jean-Pierre Filiu's very enlightening book Les frontières du Jihad . Fayard 2006.