CONCLUSION
When the work on the Strategic Compass began in 2020, hopes were high for this future document that would structure Europe's defence and security policy. We were delighted with this project, which is intended to be the "European White Paper" that we called for in our report entitled `European defence: the Challenge of Strategic Autonomy'. 91 ( * )
There are many instruments for an effective security and defence policy, and they have great potential. The recent establishment of the EDF and the European Peace Facility in particular is significant progress. But the political will to make the most of them by using them as they are intended is often lacking.
Thus, if the Strategic Compass confirms past ambitions and opens up new ones, it could finally allow the EU to acquire the autonomy it needs to face all its threats.
Can this objective be reached? As the Strategic Compass process comes to an end, stances have changed due to the recent strengthening of the transatlantic partnership, while the assessment could be refined.
Now that our work, conducted using same method of listening to and consulting our partners as in the above-cited report, is over, we are convinced that the Strategic Compass now comes with a major risk: that of proving counterproductive by fostering a sort of strategic retreat for the EU whilst NATO is reinvigorated.
Thankfully, France has the presidency next year. With precaution and, above all, an inclusive approach, it can instil a new dynamic towards the autonomy that we desire.
It has great responsibility : security threats are multiplying, while the about-face in US foreign policy, which today is resulting in a stronger NATO umbrella, remains subject to electoral uncertainties. More generally, the European Union's ability to intervene to manage crises is conditional for the rise of Europe as a power that is prosperous and protective of our interests, which most European citizens desire.
COMMITTEE EXAMINATION
Gathered on Wednesday 7 July 2021, chaired by Mr Cédric Perrin, Deputy Chairman, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee proceeded to examine the information report by Mr Ronan Le Gleut and Ms Hélène Conway-Mouret.
Mr Cédric Perrin, Chairman. - Now, we will examine the information report 'What Strategic Compass for the EU', presented by our colleagues Ronan Le Gleut and Hélène Conway-Mouret.
Mr Ronan Le Gleut, rapporteur . - At the end of the 2010s, while the threats to Europe were increasing in number and severity, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, questioned NATO's protection of European Allies--let's recall the interview he gave to Fox News on Article 5 and Montenegro. Yet the CSDP, the Common Security and Defence Policy, was stalling despite successive attempts to revive it. So, Germany proposed a new exercise, the "Strategic Compass", to give the European Union a chance to come up with a truly effective strategic document by renewing the approach in two ways: method and breadth.
Of course, this document will have a classic structure, with a first part on the threats--up to 2030--and a second part on the objectives and the resources that the European Union must give itself as a result. But the exercise has organised a reciprocal discussion between experts and representatives of the executive branches of all Member States on an unprecedented scale. Furthermore, it expands strategic thinking to all threats to work to ensure 'resilience' beyond the European Union's security.
The threat assessment was finalised in November 2020. It has not been certified politically, which avoids one pitfall: having to prioritise risks that each EU Member State perceives differently.
Throughout the first half of the year, Member States have worked on objectives and resources in four 'baskets': crisis management, capabilities--domains that were expected--resilience and partnerships--which represent new ambitions. Here, the exercise avoids another pitfall by refraining from explicitly promoting the EU's 'strategic autonomy' or 'sovereignty', which are terms that irritate certain of our European partners, who feel that it could offend the United States.
The Strategic Compass should be finalised in March 2022 under the French Presidency of the European Union. What hopes can this approach, initiated during Donald Trump's term in office, raise today, in the context of a forceful reaffirmation of the US's commitment to multilateralism and NATO's commitment to the mutual defence clause of Article 5?
Indeed, the European Union relies on NATO, not only for the defence of its territory via Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but also for crisis management at the very top of the spectrum, both of which necessarily concern the Eastern flank. In principle, the EU must be able to respond to other nearby security threats--stabilisation and peacekeeping operations, controlling migrant movements--this crisis management mainly involves the Southern border. Will it be able to do so in all circumstances? While conflicts are increasing, the number of EU crisis management operations is tending to fall.
Yet the CSDP was relaunched in 2009 by the Lisbon Treaty, and in 2016 by the 'EU Global Strategy', with a flurry of initiatives that were promising on paper. But coordination is optional, the processes have loopholes for any pacifist, Atlanticist, thrifty or sceptical state, as CSDP decisions are normally taken by unanimity.
A total integration of the security and defence tools of the Member States would of course be unthinkable in an area that is fundamentally sovereign. A CSDP that would heavily guide Member States' capability developments and could require them to participate in an operation: nobody ever wanted that, not even during Donald Trump's term in office! But it does seem possible to us to correct some of the CSDP's most obvious flaws and make it more credible, at least for crisis management.
In capability terms, 'acronym' instruments--CDP, CARD, PESCO, EDF, etc.--are designed to overcome shortfalls and acquire an EDTIB, a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, by encouraging cooperation. But what about the CDP, the Capacity Development Plan, for a start? While very structural, it is content to list the priorities that Member States want to set by taking inspiration from a list of capability shortfalls that is based on barely realistic scenarios and statements that lack sincerity.
The central problem is the preference for national capability planning. Elements of the European Union's capability process should be incorporated. This will be difficult, even more so since there is already the NATO capability process. We can also seek to correct certain flaws in how these capability tools interact. But probably not all, because some of them protect State sovereignty.
PESCO, the Permanent Structured Cooperation, has led to many projects. But it must be more selective in order to improve quality, while the risk of ITARisation--meaning the application of the US ITAR regulations--should remain a concern that does not seem to be shared with the same intensity throughout the EU. One major advance, however, is the European Defence Fund, or EDF. The Commission must ensure that it is not used as a redistribution fund.
This brings me to the operational aspects. A timid CSDP, with fewer operations while conflict is increasing, undermines the European Union's stature and credibility. Here, the Compass could provide some effective measures:
- First, we must look to better accommodate the principle of unanimity. We know the easy way out: national and ad hoc operations, Agenor, Takuba, which France specialises in. However, bypassing the CSDP deprives them of European command, funding, political cover and the possible participation of countries such as Germany that cannot act without a mandate.
Facilitating the use of the CSDP seems feasible: on EU territory, with automatic mutual aid in case of aggression based on Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in terms of crisis management with the option of proposing a 'turnkey' operation that saves on pre-studies and discussions, or with 'bricks of cooperation' provided by the CSDP to national or ad hoc operations.
Do we need to establish a European Security Council with a perspective of creating a hard core of European defence? Chancellor Angela Merkel imagined it, President Emmanuel Macron ultimately approved it, but that was three years ago, when there was a different American president...
A second avenue consists in improving operations and making them more incentivising. First, we can further the quality of military operations by improving the training provided to foreign forces with the EU Training Missions (EUTM), of which there are three, in Mali, Central African Republic and Somalia. From this viewpoint, the establishment this year of the EPF, the European Peace Facility, which allows for funding the provision of lethal equipment, is real progress.
A crucial point, the speed of force generation: the battlegroups, battalions of 1,500 troops established in 2006 to constitute a permanent military presence, have never been deployed and are often unavailable. Funding through the EPF would be incentivising. Better: as part of the discussions on the Strategic Compass, a small majority of States support the French proposal of a 'first entry force', the core of which could be two big battlegroups, with land, air and maritime components. It would be an occasion for the Compass to reaffirm and clarify the complementarity between the EU and NATO in line with a realistic level of ambition. By finally clearly stating what the European Union must be able to do, we can only increase operational and capability coordination.
Another vector of improvement, the European military command, i.e. the MPCC--the Military Planning and Conduct Capability--placed under the authority of the European Union Military Staff, which would avoid relying on NATO or a Member State to direct a CSDP operation. Currently limited to EUTMs, their role should be extended to command executive missions and receive an OHQ, in other words a military planning staff that covers all military missions. In this perspective, France supports maintaining the unicity of the European Union's military command and the MPCC--which Germany would like to call into question--to preserve the unity of capability studies.
Finally, it is imperative to overcome the shortfalls of a European intelligence apparatus that is not up to the challenges we face.
Ms Hélène Conway-Mouret , rapporteur. - Before getting into the heart of the subject, I would like to reiterate that, for this report, we used the same process as for our 2019 report on European defence, which consists in consulting our European partners. We did this through videoconferences and questionnaires sent to embassies, nearly all of which responded. This approach allowed us to settle on a certain number of points quite quickly, often in a discouraging way since we realised that European citizens and Member State parliaments were not at all familiar with the Strategic Compass. So, I would like to congratulate the committee for taking on this issue, which has allowed us to study it, understand that many things that happen in Europe are often poorly understood and that, with the Strategic Compass, we have a tool that is both remarkable and unprecedented.
The successive attempts to improve the CSDP, which is now thirty years old, call for us to be realistic when formulating new ambitions. However, 'resilience'--one of the Strategic Compass's four baskets--holds all of the promise for a future project.
Maintaining access to contested strategic spaces, reducing our industrial dependence in security and defence, reinforcing our access to critical technologies and strategic materials, guaranteeing our economic, health and climate security...in a word, resilience is security outside the CSDP.
The European Commission is very active on these issues. We can see a change in dimension since the health crisis. The establishment of DG DEFIS in 2020 demonstrates the EU's new propensity to leverage its economic power for strategic purposes.
This geopolitical Europe also relies on partnership, the Compass's fourth basket. Pertaining to the United States, Joe Biden has reversed most of his predecessor's positions, which were heavily criticised by the European Union, and relations seem calmer. However, we should refrain from simply following along. First, American interests have pivoted to Asia, with a very tense bilateral relationship with China. The European Union, for its part, has a less competitive relationship, notably through the requirement of economic reciprocity. Thus, it is important that we develop our own Indo-Pacific partnership. The partnership with Africa is also of primordial importance, with China seen this time as a rival. Then, there is the partnership with NATO, by far the most problematic, as it has become structural for the Strategic Compass.
We are seeing the great comeback of Atlantic affinities. Joe Biden's election went hand in hand with NATO's reaffirmation of its protection to European Allies. This was all that was needed for Europeans to lose momentum on strategic autonomy and the CSDP...
Brexit added an argument that tipped the balance in favour of NATO, since the United Kingdom is the Ally with the greatest amount of defence spending--$60 billion--after the United States--$785 billion. This means that EU members belonging to NATO now only represent a fifth of defence spending among Alliance countries, as the NATO Secretary General likes to point out. Furthermore, the health crisis, while drawing attention to resilience, has entailed heavy spending to support the economy that may result in budget adjustments. EU Allies will be happy to count on NATO to allow themselves to forego capabilities and operations. We can add the upcoming German and French elections, which could lead to changes that might weigh on the European Union's mobilisation for security and defence.
All the indicators on the way to strategic autonomy are flashing red. At the same time, coordination with NATO is becoming random.
First, the European Union's geostrategic position is different from NATO and the United States: China is not our ultimate enemy, Russia is still a neighbour, and Turkey's actions impact us directly, unlike for the Americans, for whom it also remains an Ally.
Secondly, nothing says that the NATO umbrella, largely opened once again since Joe Biden's election, will remain impermeable should the Republicans win the next presidential elections, or even midterms in a little over a year. Trumpism remains a major political force.
Thirdly, NATO is currently undergoing a 'great leap forward', under the initiative of its Secretary General. He is promoting a 360° defence strategy that was taken up by the NATO 2030 agenda, which the Allies have just approved. The use of Article 5 in case of a cyberattack is promoted, which deserves clarification since these acts could come from countries where the European Union and the United States do not share the same risks and goals. Furthermore, the agenda considers resilience in its broadest sense, and it goes so far as assigning objectives to Allies and monitoring their achievement!
If all the agenda's prospects come to pass, the resilience that the European Union seeks to orchestrate could be overshadowed by a NATO-led resilience, just as the CSDP barely survives alongside the Alliance. While the immense power of the American army may explain this, nothing would justify it given the European Union's resources.
Fourthly, in the domain of capability, the NATO process is better respected than the EU's, to the detriment of the EDTIB's development. The 2030 agenda provides for the establishment of a NATO fund for innovation that could weaken the European Defence Fund.
Fifthly, the Strategic Compass is being drawn up at the same time as the 'Strategic Concept', another strategic document that NATO is working on. To avoid the latter bleeding onto the former, the reflections and their completion were pushed back so that the Strategic Concept should only be released in summer 2022. But NATO is ramping up its work and reflections, and, according to certain observers, everything is happening as if it were in a race.
Fundamentally, the Strategic Compass has become a risky exercise. We have identified five risks that can overlap.
The first risk, of course, is of a document with a weak scope. The reaffirmation of the Atlantic cover has reduced most Member States' ambitions for the CSDP.
The definitive threat assessment, the one that will be politically approved in the Compass, could focus on the most consensual threats--hybrid and technological--favouring resilience over crisis management. For the CSDP, this would mean losing the two years spent on drafting the Strategic Compass. This half-failure could be relativised - and made presentable - through binding initiatives to improve only non-executive civilian or military missions, which Germany prefers to executive missions.
The second risk is a document solely based on NATO's needs and that would flow directly into the Strategic Concept. The Compass would not offer anything that could duplicate NATO resources or distance itself from NATO's ambitions--whether in terms of the military or resilience. Its main recitals would concern the partnership with NATO. There should be a political dialogue between Josep Borrell and the NATO Secretary General to achieve the necessary coherence between the two exercises while ensuring the autonomy of our approach. But nothing indicates that such a dialogue can take place...
The third risk is a more ambitious document with little effect. Some might be looking to use it as window dressing. In any case, the final document could include interesting opportunities, especially in terms of resilience concerning contested spaces, that should be made permanent. In terms of the CSDP, France's proposal of a first entry force, which my colleague just spoke about, would be significant progress. Supported by Josep Borrell, it could be acceptable, even from an Atlanticist point of view. This is why a mechanism for political monitoring and support should be implemented, in line with one of France's key concerns.
The fourth risk is, in our opinion, of a document with too much detail that could prove counterproductive in a crisis. The pandemic has shown that the EU can find willpower when events require. In a crisis, an overly formal document, especially if it provides for a minimal action capability, would be a straitjacket. This reasoning also applies to relations with NATO, where there must always be potential for adjustments.
The final risk is that France, fearing a Strategic Compass that might tarnish its presidency, does too much. We should refrain from indulging our tendency for statements and promoting concepts, which scare off and upset our partners! But France is listened to, and its assessments are eagerly awaited: it should show respect as it stands by its convictions, explains them, and tries to convince others.
A failure of the Strategic Compass would be very damaging for the CSDP: disillusions in this area delay any possibility of progress for a long time.
Here, we have a sizable regret, which brings us to the methodology: discussions on the Strategic Compass were not extended to the parliaments, depriving the Strategic Compass of a lever of enrichment and depth of audience among European citizens, the lack of which we fear we will regret when it comes to completing the exercise. We also propose that the Strategic Compass be reviewed every five years. It is important that the parliaments are systematically involved.
Mr Cédric Perrin, Chairman . - You call our attention to the need to remain vigilant on the subject and exercise a right to follow up. In this regard, I would like to inform you that the Senate will hold the CFSP/CSDP conference of the Parliamentary portion of the French presidency of the European Union. It will be an occasion for us to return to this issue with our partners.
Mr André Guiol . - The rapporteurs mentioned the problem of the growing power of European defence and NATO. I recently read that, for many American military personnel, the two were incompatible, that it is one or the other. How can we demonstrate that it can be one and the other?
Ms Hélène Conway-Mouret , rapporteur. - In our 2019 report, we recommended writing a white paper and feel that here Europe has the necessary tool for achieving this, on the basis of a joint threat assessment among the 27. Then, there was this unilateral decision by the NATO Secretary General to initiate a very similar process to the Strategic Compass, depriving us of a truly independent exercise by pushing us to insert it into the Atlantic Alliance's much larger process. Furthermore, it has become sort of a race; we can see NATO, which is undergoing a renewal, is now concerned with climate change, resilience--in short, subjects that do not fall within its historical prerogatives.
Mr Ronan Le Gleut, rapporteur . - Let's remember that a certain number of European Union Member States are not members of NATO. The two organisations do not totally overlap. To allow the European Union to adopt a position, we proposed a white paper in our 2019 report--of course the idea was not new, but we highlighted it. So, the existence of this Strategic Compass is good news; it is in line with the recommendations of our commission two years ago, and we can take some pride in it. Just the fact that this exercise exists, the fact that the intelligence services of the European Union Member States are having discussions towards establishing a shared threat assessment, is a first. This considerable advance fundamentally answers your question: it is indeed one and the other.
Ms Hélène Conway-Mouret , rapporteur. - I would add that one is intended to strengthen the other.
Ms Gisèle Jourda . - You mentioned a subject that is dear to our hearts, both within this committee and in the European Affairs Committee, and that is the European Defence Fund. This is a fundamental component for the European aspect of defence, while it has already been impacted financially. Would it be possible to have clarifications on the risks to this instrument?
Ms Hélène Conway-Mouret , rapporteur. - Indeed, France supported an allocation of €13 billion for the European Defence Fund. We are at €8 billion. But we are satisfied, because it is the first time that the European Union has established such a fund. Within this fund, we count 26 projects that have been subjected to a very inclusive process that encourages the involvement of SMBs from a variety of Member States in a large initial project. It is a good structure that is headed in the right direction. Of course, there is the danger that sprinkling some more money will not support projects that will truly allow the European Union to stay competitive in the industrial field. But the danger that we have just mentioned comes from the fact that NATO wants to be involved in innovation by creating its own fund, which would of course have more funding than the European Defence Fund and risks replacing it. We have fought to ensure that companies from non-EU member countries cannot access the European Defence Fund. The United States in particular spends billions on research and innovation in its own country, and access to the European Defence Fund would allow them to access European taxpayers' money to increase this spending even more. Of course, European companies work for American companies, or are subsidiaries of these companies, which try to enter the European Defence Fund through the backdoor. Nevertheless, this fund exists, it is meant to grow over time, and it represents considerable progress. In our 2019 report, we also proposed the creation of a directorate, which was also established. In all, two of our proposals have prospered...in any case, I don't know whether, in twenty years' time, the European Defence Fund will have been absorbed by NATO; I fear that the situation has become a bit complicated.
Ms Joëlle Garriaud-Maylam . - I think we need to remain modest, collaborations between services in different countries existed well before the work on the Strategic Compass began. Furthermore, many of us here participate in the NATO parliamentary assembly and I, for one, am annoyed at hearing the same old speeches and ideas about the Alliance so often. There is Emmanuel Macron's argument, this almost romantic vision of a Europe that would work on its defence with Russia... I would like to reiterate that, in the very words of its Secretary General, the Atlantic Alliance is the most successful in the world, that no country has ever left it and that it ensures our defence without ever having encountered the slightest problem in this regard, even if there are tensions on the European Union's borders. A very large number of the European Union's Member States are extremely favourable to NATO, unlike what we may have heard here, whereas others do not want to contribute enough--like they should do--to the European Union's budget, so much so that NATO's protection is particularly welcome. So this anti-NATO rhetoric, which tends to spread, this background music, is becoming quite irritating to those who see what is going on at NATO, the work that is done, all my colleagues present at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly are, I believe, aware of this.
The committee authorises the publication of the information report.
* 91 Senate report no. 626 (2018-2019), July 2019.