N° 753
SENATE
EXTRAORDINAIRY SESSION OF 2020-2021
Filed at the President's Office of the Senate on 7 July 2021
INFORMATION REPORT
DRAWN UP
on behalf of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee (1) on « What Strategic Compass for the European Union ? »,
By Mr Ronan LE GLEUT and Mrs Hélène CONWAY-MOURET,
Senators
(1) This committee is composed of : Mr Christian Cambon , Chairman ; Messrs Pascal Allizard, Olivier Cadic, Olivier Cigolotti, Robert del Picchia, André Gattolin, Guillaume Gontard, Jean-Noël Guérini, Joël Guerriau, Pierre Laurent, Cédric Perrin, Gilbert Roger, Jean-Marc Todeschini , Deputy Chairpersons ; Mss Hélène Conway-Mouret, Joëlle Garriaud-Maylam, Messrs Philippe Paul, Hugues Saury , Secretaries ; Messrs François Bonneau, Gilbert Bouchet, Ms Marie-Arlette Carlotti, Messrs Alain Cazabonne, Pierre Charon, Édouard Courtial, Yves Détraigne, Ms Nicole Duranton, Messrs Philippe Folliot, Bernard Fournier, Ms Sylvie Goy-Chavent, Mr Jean-Pierre Grand, Ms Michelle Gréaume, Messrs. André Guiol, Alain Houpert, Ms Gisèle Jourda, Messrs Alain Joyandet, Jean-Louis Lagourgue, Ronan Le Gleut, Jacques Le Nay, Ms Vivette Lopez, Messrs Jean-Jacques Panunzi, François Patriat, Gérard Poadja, Ms Isabelle Raimond-Pavero, Messrs Stéphane Ravier, Bruno Sido, Rachid Temal, Mickaël Vallet, André Vallini, Yannick Vaugrenard, Richard Yung .
SUMMARY
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KEY OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ? Europe's citizens know almost nothing about the discussions under way about the Strategic Compass , the European Union's upcoming strategic document for 2030 that will structure its security to a considerable extent. The national representative bodies that are the Member States' parliaments have been excluded from this process , even though it will have a significant impact on the future. This report tries to correct this oversight by informing the public , because the subject is complex, and by alerting them, because the risks and stakes are high. In the future, parliaments must be involved in periodically updates on the Strategic Compass . ? The work on the Compass has been limited to experts and the executive branches and was launched during the uncertain period inaugurated by the Trump administration , which questioned the security guarantee that NATO provides to Europe. The Biden Administration has reassured the Allies and reaffirmed NATO's coverage, so much so that their ambitions for Europe's security and defence have been greatly scaled back. ? However, Trumpism is not dead , and even if it does die, the United States' strategic interests do not always coincide with those of the EU, so it should take care to leave room for manoeuvre and autonomy in defence and security to manage crises . Furthermore, NATO's responsibilities now tend to cover resilience , a domain that the EU has also taken up via the Strategic Compass. The EU should assert its own priorities whilst seeking coordination with NATO. ? The Strategic Compass should be finalised in March 2022 under the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union (first half of 2022). France is active on issues of defence and security . It readily takes strong initiatives and invokes general principles such as strategic autonomy. The gap between its ambitions and those of most Member States has become obvious . ? If France wants to be convincing, it must take care to listen to its partners and promote balanced measures tactfully and with conviction, especially when working with Atlanticist Member States that are more reluctant than ever to move further towards strategic autonomy. These measures could: - seek to improve how the many instruments intended to overcome the EU's capability shortfalls operate and interact and work to acquire a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) by encouraging cooperation, - try to better accommodate the principle of unanimity , which is a major obstacle to initiating operations, which are increasingly rare despite an increase in risks and conflicts, - work to improve operations, in particular by Europeanising military command and speeding up force generation . A 'first entry force' of 5,000 trained troops could be established, finally mobilising the battlegroups; created in 2006, they have never been deployed and are often unavailable. These possibilities would show substantial progress towards a defence and security policy that seems out of steam despite several revivals. France must therefore support the implementation of a mechanism to politically monitor and support the Strategic Compass . ? It may be difficult to walk this fine line, but it is essential, as the potential pitfalls of the Strategic Compass are serious : it could prove to be completely lacking in scope, or it could emerge with ambitions that entirely overlap with those of NATO. Depending on how detailed it is, the Compass could end up being a straitjacket if there is a major crisis . |
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Recommendations for the French Presidency of the Council of the EU 1. Reiterate that, through the Strategic Compass, the European Union is entitled to set its own priorities, which may be distinct from those of NATO. 2. Take care to support measures (see above) that will appear to our partners as balanced and concrete and support an open and respectful discussion. 3. Promote a mechanism for politically monitoring and supporting the Strategic Compass. 4. Propose that the Strategic Compass be updated every five years, each time involving Member States' parliaments. |
I. A STRATEGIC COMPASS FOR A FREE AND STRONG EUROPE
The start of this century has been characterised by the emergence of new types of threats--jihadist, cyber, spatial, 'hybrid'--destabilising initiatives from middle-ranking powers such as Turkey and Iran, and the rise of China, which now disputes the United States' global leadership. Naturally, the US's "pivot to Asia" calls into question the priority NATO gives to Europe's security.
However, common security and defence policy (CSDP) operations are becoming increasingly rare . EU Member States agree on the need to do more collectively. But they are still struggling to be more specific and operational in a sovereign domain that requires unanimity, where interventions and investments are costly and where, on the eastern border, NATO appears as the only reliable solution.
A. A COMPASS DESIGNED TO RECONCILE ASSESSMENTS
To jumpstart a constructive review of EU security, in 2019 Germany proposed drafting a "strategic compass", a sort of white paper for EU defence and security , which we recommended in the report "European defence: the Challenge of Strategic Autonomy". 1 ( * ) Initiated during the German Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2020 and expected to be completed during the French presidency in the first half of 2022, this exercise organises a discussion among experts and representatives of the executive branches of all Member States on an unprecedented scale . It began with a threat assessment based on contributions from their intelligence services. Finalised in late 2020 by the European External Action Service (EEAS), the classified assessment was not approved politically , which avoided having to prioritise threats that are perceived very differently from one country to another.
On this basis, the discussion then revolved around four 'baskets': ' crisis management ' and ' resilience ' for the objectives, ' capabilities ' and ' partnerships ' for the means. A strategic review extended to resilience and partnerships seeks to provide an exhaustive response to the threats. The exercise avoids explicitly promoting the EU's 'strategic autonomy' and 'sovereignty', terms that still irritate certain Member States. The EEAS will provide a synthesis of Member States' contributions in the second half of 2021, and the final political discussion should be completed in March 2022.
What can we hope for from this approach, given the context of the US's and NATO's recent return to the international stage?
B. A COMPASS TO JUMPSTART THE CSDP...
The results of previous jumpstarts to the common security and defence policy , from the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and then the ' European Union Global Strategy ' (EUGS) in 2016, have been below expectations. At any given time, any process can be blocked due to a lack of a shared vision by the rule of unanimity.
1. An ambitious approach to capability, but which remains disappointing
The EU has developed many instruments to make up for its capability shortfalls and acquire a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) by encouraging cooperation. But, for the large part, Member States are orienting their investments according to their own strategic interests or those of NATO. They are also undertaking partnerships outside the CSDP, such as those between France and Germany (the future combat air system, future tank) or with the United Kingdom (Lancaster House). As a result, Russia, with defence spending nearly four times less than the EU, discredits the CSDP on the eastern border in the eyes of certain Member States .
a) First avenue: better fulfil the potential of each of the instruments available
• The Capability Development Plan (CDP) sets the priorities in terms of the EU's defence capabilities. In the first phase, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) uses the Headline Goal Process (HLGP) to identify the military resources needed for the five illustrative scenarios go smoothly. By reconciling these needs with the forces that the States report providing to the EU, the EUMS makes an inventory of gaps in capability, based on which the European Defence Agency establishes the CDP.
However, the Member States only report a small share of their capabilities here, compared to around half as part of the NDPP, the NATO Defence Planning Process. This 'under-reporting', which reflects a hesitancy towards the CSDP, reduces the reliability of the EU's capability process . Furthermore, the HLGP's most demanding scenario, which lacks credibility given that it provides for the deployment of 60,000 soldiers, leads to targets that are totally unreachable. In France, the Ministry of the Armed Forces supports adding a sixth, more realistic scenario , that resembles Operation Serval. It would be based on the deployment of just 5,000 soldiers but would still be very demanding in terms of equipment in order to fight in a hard-to-access environment.
• The CARD (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence) presented by the EDA gives a complete overview of Member States' spending and investments, including research. It allows us to see their defence planning and the development of their capabilities while listing the gaps with regards to the CDP. This inventory is intended to facilitate cooperation on capabilities. In November 2020, European defence ministers approved the first CARD , which criticised a ' costly fragmentation ' and identified 55 possibilities for multinational cooperation in the military field and 6 ` next generation capabilities as priority areas' . We fear that the Strategic Compass, as a parallel process, encourages a certain 'wait-and-see' approach.
• The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) , established in late 2017, seeks to increase defence spending by adopting NATO's 2014 objective for each Ally to allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence , with 20% of that for investments, and to provide a framework for cooperative projects in operations and equipment to increase European capabilities. PESCO, which also includes smaller countries, already includes 47 projects of this type. But the results remain mixed , with unequal achievements that call for being more selective with projects and an openness to third countries since 2020 that requires vigilance . This is particularly the case as regards the US's ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations), which prevents the sale without their consent of equipment that includes American components.
• With the new European Defence Fund (EDF) , the Commission is looking to support investment in defence research and the development of shared technologies and equipment, including PESCO projects. Non-EU member countries are not eligible for the fund. With €8 billion for the 2021-2027 period, a much greater amount than the instruments it replaces, this fund is real progress , but its success could be hindered by the tendency of many Member States to see it as a redistribution fund.
b) Second avenue: improve the interactions between available instruments
In short, the CDP covers the list of priorities that Member States want to set by vaguely taking inspiration from a list of capability shortfalls established based on barely realistic scenarios and statements that lack sincerity. However, it does provide structure. The philosophies at work should interact in a better way : the EUMS with the illustrative scenarios, the EDA with the CDP and the CARD, and the Commission, which organises industrial cooperation via the EDF. All while respecting the constraint of aligning with the timeline of NATO's capability planning. Finally, it would be good to integrate aspects of the EU's capability process in national planning.
2. An operational approach that is running out of steam
Out of 17 missions and operations under way, three so-called 'executive' military operation involve combat forces: Althea (2004), Atalante (2008) and Irini (2015). That leaves three 'non-executive' military operations, which are training missions (EUTM), and 11 civilian missions.
a) First avenue: overcome the principle of unanimity
• The current easy option: ad hoc coordination : to act quickly, Member States--especially France with missions like Agenor and Takuba--are more than willing to intervene outside the CSDP. In doing so, they deprive themselves of its benefits (command, financing, political legitimacy) and the participation of certain Member States. Germany, for example, is legally prohibited from participating in an operation without a UN, NATO or EU mandate, except for certain preventive actions.
• The avenue of automaticity in case of aggression : the Strategic Compass exercise seems to reveal a new consensus for the mutual defence clause of Article 42.7 TEU, invoked just once, by France after the Paris attacks in 2015.
• The avenue of facilitated consent for greater flexibility : Article 44 TEU allows us to imagine that a Member State could propose a 'turnkey' operation conceived with a few other partner States. This would save time in the pre-studies and discussions between Member States with a view to establishing an operation concept. Another avenue, put forward by France, is that of 'bricks' of cooperation that the CSDP could provide to a national operation, to an ad hoc European cooperation such as Takuba or Agenor, or to a NATO or UN operation.
• The avenue of bypassing institutions : outside the CSDP and the EU, the studies conducted by the 13 Member States of the European Intervention Initiative (EII) favour the emergence of a common strategic culture. Other multinational initiatives in Europe seek to create a quick response force : Eurocorps, Franco-German Brigade, Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF).
• The avenue of a hard core: establish a European Security Council? Since EU Member States are struggling to agree on defence issues, we could wonder whether to establish a 'vanguard' outside the CSDP. This option, presented several times by Angela Merkel as a 'European Security Council', was ultimately supported by Emmanuel Macron (joint statement of 19 June 2018).
b) Second avenue: improve operations and their context
• Improve mission quality
The force generation derived from the three EUTMs suffers from incomplete training. Civilian missions mainly suffer from unsatisfactory expertise in regard to the needs due to a lack of ambition from contributing States. In Africa, these gaps are becoming even more problematic, given that Russia, China, and even Turkey are now there as rivals.
• Accelerate force generation by making battlegroups sustainable
Established in 2006, the EU Battlegroups are each made up of 1,500 troops and are intended to provide a military presence in groups of two. However, they have never been deployed and are often unavailable .
Collective financing through the European Peace Facility would be incentivising. During the discussions on the Strategic Compass, a small majority of States co-signed a French non-paper proposing a "first entry force" in line with the sixth scenario (see above). Its core could be two big battlegroups with land, air and maritime components.
• Better funding for missions, the European Peace Facility (EPF)
With €5 billion for the 2021-2027 period outside the EU's regular budget, this year the EPF replaces the Athena mechanism, which funds certain shared expenses for CSDP operations, and the African Peace Facility (APF). The EPF materialises progress that was anticipated by allowing for direct military aid, even of a lethal nature , which will help to improve a crucial point of training in EUTMs.
• Europeanise military command
For the command of CSDP military operations, it is possible to employ either:
- the 'Berlin Plus' agreements (2003) , which allow the NATO command structure to be used, which was the case in Macedonia and Bosnia (where the Althea operation still uses it); using these agreements again currently seems unlikely,
- an 'autonomous European Union operation' that relies on a national military staff, chosen for each operation from among five eligible Member States, each time requiring a period of familiarisation with how the relevant European bodies operate,
- or, since 2017, for non-executive military operations, the MPCC (Military Planning and Conduct Capability), led by the head of the EUMS.
The three EUTMs are overseen by the MPCC. But the human and material situation at the MPCC does not always allow it to assume its role perfectly. The head of the EUMS is not expected to declare it fully operationally capable until the end of 2021, one year behind schedule. Later, it would be beneficial to extend the MPCC's scope to executive military missions. This would provide a military staff for planning, otherwise referred to as an 'OHQ', 2 ( * ) for all military missions. In this perspective, France supports maintaining a single command for the EUMS and MPCC in order to preserve the unity of capability reflections and a satisfactory balance between the Council and the Commission. Indeed, certain Member States would like to call them into question.
• Provide information to military command
European intelligence is very patchy. Here, France advocates using the EU's electronic intelligence tools, including SatCen (the satellite image analysis centre), and increasing information gathering capabilities.
C. ... AND RESIZE THE EU'S ACTIONS TO MEET ITS SECURITY NEEDS?
1. 'Resilience', a necessary and consensual objective supported by the Commission
Resilience is about preserving access to contested strategic spaces such as cyberspace, space, seas and airspace. It is also about reducing our industrial dependence in security and defence and strengthening our access to critical technologies and strategic materials. Finally, it is about ensuring our economic, health and climate security. The Commission, which now seeks to be 'geopolitical', is very active on these issues. A change of dimension can already be seen in the negotiations with pharmaceutical laboratories, the European recovery plan, and the actions towards Russia and China. In 2020, the DG DEFIS (Defence Industry and Space) was created, headed by Thierry Breton, demonstrating the EU's new propensity to leverage its economic power to strategic ends.
2. 'Partnerships' that should be nurtured carefully
Reinforcing a stature as a geostrategic player implies making many partnerships. The partnership with NATO has special weight, to the point that it is provides more structure for CSDP than the latter does for it.
a) NATO: the central issue of 'Who does what?' with the EU
• NATO guarantees the security of the EU's Allied territory through the mutual defence clause in Article 5, the very foundation of the alliance. It is also responsible for managing crises outside its members' territories, integrated into its strategic concept in 1999.
The EU, with a CSDP that meets the level of ambition set out in Helsinki in 1999, ought to be able to manage crises in its nearby environment without NATO. The EU cannot count on the consent of all non-EU allies (Turkey opposes certain operations in the Mediterranean) nor on their aid (the United States may not want to get involved). But the CSDP's potential is insufficient , so much so that the distribution of roles tends to end up as follow:
- NATO defends Europe's territory and manages crises at the top of the spectrum, both involving the Eastern border,
- the European Union responds to other security challenges around Europe--stabilisation and peacekeeping operations, controlling migrant movements--which mainly involves crises on the southern border.
This complementarity between NATO and the EU must be reaffirmed and clarified with a realistic level of ambition, which would lend credibility to Europe as a power, possibly based on the French first entry scenario (see above). Whatever the case, without drawing up a detailed, rigid distribution of roles that could prove counterproductive, the Strategic Compass should finally clearly state what the EU must know how to do.
In addition to the 'Berlin Plus' agreements (see above), the relationship with NATO should be seen in terms of its many partnerships, which have been revived since the Warsaw summit in July 2016. NATO and the EU now exchange real-time alerts on cyberattacks, participate in each other's exercises and collaborate in their response to migration crises. Military mobility, a major chapter of cooperation for both organisations, is what justifies the participation of the United States, Canada and Norway in a specific PESCO project.
b) USA, UK, China, Indo-Pacific, Africa
Joe Biden reversed most of the decisions criticised by the EU. The quality of the relationship with the United States has been restored, but there are certain constants that should lead us to beware following them blindly : the pivot to Asia and their desire to impose their approach to China, the promotion of a capability integration within NATO that benefits their military-industrial complex (thus at the expense of the EDTIB), economic competition, extraterritorial sanctions, ITAR regulations, etc.
Without giving up on establishing a privileged security and defence link with the United Kingdom , we must be realistic about the post-Brexit appetite for European mechanisms of a country so strongly anchored in its transatlantic partnership. Its latest strategic review was drawn up with NATO and the US in mind, and the UK is seeking to inject into the Alliance the resilience issues that the EU is committed to addressing.
China poses a growing challenge to the EU, especially on issues of resilience: digital sovereignty, misinformation, industrial capacity, competitiveness, market access, risk of denial of access to sea lanes, especially in the straits. The initial enthusiasm of the 17+1 member countries is waning. There is an increasingly widespread conviction that we must 'act as one' towards China, which is described as being at once a rival, competitor, and a partner and which is disserved by a now-conspicuous hubris. Dealing with the 'China issue' solely through NATO would be a pitfall that risks allowing America to interfere in the EU's trade policy. Therefore, the EU must quickly develop a strategic line that requires reciprocity in economic matters. Indeed, China could takeover Former President Trump's role as a driver of the EU's 'geopoliticisation".
In essence, the Indo-Pacific is another way for the EU to deal with China, which is likely to deny certain maritime access to this area that is home to 60% of the world's population and the most dynamic GDPs. But there is a risk that such a broad security and defence issue could be more appropriately dealt with in the NATO framework , together with the maritime powers of the United States and the United Kingdom, at the risk of reducing the EU's autonomy in dealing with China.
Finally, the EU must confirm a " pivot to Africa " where, in a newly competitive environment (China, Russia, Turkey), stronger cooperation aimed at consolidating institutions, developing infrastructure, educating the people and combating the crisis-induced poverty will promote growth and security, aid in the fight against terrorism, and help control emigration.
II. A COMPASS THAT MIGHT BE POINTING A LITTLE TOO FAR WEST
A. THE GREAT RETURN OF ATLANTIC AFFINITIES ...
1. NATO's renewed credibility in the face of a CSDP weakened by Brexit...
The election of Joe Biden and the announcement that the United States is resuming its role as the world's policeman, notably within the framework of a NATO reaffirming its role as the Allies' protector, are reassuring. Similarly, the appointments of Antony Blinken and Karen Donfried, Deputy for European and Eurasian Affairs, were welcomed throughout the European Union. Reassured, European decision-makers often aspire to resume the course of the traditional Atlantic relationship.
Compared to the pre-Trump situation, Brexit adds an argument for tipping the balance in favour of NATO , since the UK is the ally with the highest defence spending ($60 bn), after the US ($785 bn) and ahead of Germany ($56 bn) and France ($50 bn). EU countries now account for only one fifth of the defence spending of NATO countries .
2. ...by the health crisis and the ensuing budget impacts...
The health crisis has resulted in heavy spending to support the economy while focusing security attention on the lower end of the spectrum and resilience. Thus, EU Allies will be more likely to rely on NATO for the upper end of the spectrum, especially as they are forced to make budget adjustments . These may entail capability and operational sacrifices , for which better coordination would be unlikely to compensate.
3. ... and by political configurations likely to become less favourable
The German elections in September 2021 and the French elections in the spring of 2022 could jeopardise the EU's mobilisation for security and defence. In Germany, the elections could result in a new coalition that includes the Greens, who are historically more suspicious of armed intervention and perhaps more intransigent towards China and Russia - as is the US.
B. ... DESPITE INCREASINGLY DEMANDING AND COMPLEX COORDINATION WITH NATO
1. Potentially different geostrategic aims
China is an ultimate threat for the US (which sets the agenda for NATO), not for the EU . The European Union's economic and strategic interests may justify choices of cooperation, including with Russia, that the United States might not approve of. Conversely, Turkey, against which the EU may have an interest in acting, is part of NATO, which does not want to weaken itself by alienating an ally whose geographical position is considered strategic by the United States.
2. The intangible 'NATO umbrella'
Joe Biden has a very slim majority in Congress, especially in the Senate, which weakens his international policy and gives reason to worry for the upcoming elections. The midterm elections will take place in little more than a year, and presidential elections in a little more than three.
The Pax Americana, renewed via NATO, could be shorter than hoped. It should be seen as a chance for the EU to buy time to organise its security in a more comprehensive way.
3. The imminent perspective of a 'great leap forward'
NATO is showing great ambitions, as evidenced in particular the NATO 2030 agenda , approved by the Allies in Brussels on 14 June 2021. In the past few months, NATO's work has developed a 360° defence strategy , summarised herein.
The Agenda suggests using Article 5 in case of a cyberattack, which merits clarification. These actions could come from countries where the EU and the United States do not share the same risks or objectives, and identifying the source country requires caution. Furthermore, it considers resilience in its widest sense, going so far as assigning objectives to Allies and monitoring their achievement.
If all the Agenda's prospects come to pass, the resilience that the EU seeks to orchestrate could be overshadowed by a NATO-led resilience, just as the CSDP barely survives alongside the Alliance. While the immense power of the American army may explain this, nothing would justify it given the EU's resources.
4. NATO's capability advantage
Europe's capability planning is less directive and incentivising than the NDPP (NATO Defence Planning Process), and is less adhered to , particularly by Member States without a military programme act and which defend their military budgets solely on this basis.
This raises the issue of the coherence among the commitments of countries in the EU and in NATO. 38 of the 47 PESCO projects meet NATO priorities to a certain extend. However, it is not NATO's role, through the NDPP, to have a say in the commitments made within the EU. In the same vein, modelling Europe's norms and standards developed through PESCO on NATO norms and standards could jeopardise the establishment of an EDTIB. Reserving EDF funding for European projects is a partial safeguard. But the Agenda plans to set up a NATO fund for innovation .
5. The concurrence of strategic reflections
The Strategic Compass , which envisages a partnership approach to NATO, is not intended to be a local version of the "Strategic Concept" that the Alliance is working on. On paper, the reflections are not taking place at the same time, nor are they being completed simultaneously, since the Strategic Concept is expected to be released in summer 2022. The schedules were planned so that the Strategic Compass would not be influenced. But NATO, as requested by its Secretary General in the framework of the NATO 2030 strategy, is intensifying its work and reflections. According to certain observers, everything is happening as if NATO were in a race. Its options risk heavily influencing the Strategic Compass --which would suit the desires of countries such as Poland or certain Baltic countries. A political dialogue between the HR/VP and the NATO Secretary General would be very useful to arrive at the necessary coherence between the two exercises while ensuring the autonomy of the Strategic Compass approach . But currently, nothing indicates that such a dialogue could take place.
III. A STRATEGIC COMPASS THAT HAS BECOME RISKY
A failure of the Strategic Compass would be very damaging for the CSDP : experience shows that disillusions in this area push back any possibility of progress for many years. Here, we express our great regret as to the methodology: concertation and discussions on the Strategic Compass were not extended to parliaments. This deprives the Strategic Compass of a means to enrich and deepen the audience among Europe's citizens, whose absence will weigh on the process's completion in early 2022.
A. THE RISK OF AN UNAMBITIOUS DOCUMENT
The stated reaffirmation and strengthening of the Atlantic security guarantee weigh on the ambitions most Member States have for the CSDP. The threat assessment that they will accept politically may focus only on the most consensual, hybrid and technological ones. This could favour resilience over crisis management and capabilities that are solely industrial and technological. For the CSDP, this would mean losing the two years spent on drafting the Strategic Compass. We might then add the years following the publication of the Strategic Compass, which is still being presented as binding for Member States.
An incomplete Strategic Compass could be relativised--and made presentable--through binding initiatives to improve only non-executive civilian or military missions , which Germany prefers to executive missions. But we must oppose any attempt to promote the use of the military within borders to assume, in the name of resilience, a generalist role that would permanently distance them from their primary mission.
B. THE RISK OF A DOCUMENT GEARED SOLELY TO NATO'S NEEDS
There is a real risk that the document will fit the mould of NATO's Strategic Concept. The compass would not offer anything that could be seen as a duplicate of NATO resources or as distancing itself from NATO's ambitions, whether in terms of the military or of resilience. Major expectations would then revolve around a deeper partnership with NATO.
We fear that the Strategic Compass's ambitions would be partly within the hands of the United States. Indeed, the signals that they send in terms of the room allowed for EU autonomy will be interpreted and followed very closely by the most Atlanticist Member States through to the very end of the process.
C. THE RISK OF A MORE AMBITIOUS DOCUMENT WITH LITTLE EFFECT
However, the final document could include interesting opportunities , especially in terms of resilience concerning contested spaces, that should be made permanent. In terms of the CSDP, the first entry force , supported by Josep Borrell, would be a significant advance that could be considered globally acceptable if it is conceived to avoid any duplication that could offend NATO or the United States.
This is why a mechanism for political monitoring and support should be implemented, in line with one of France's key concerns.
D. THE RISK OF A DOCUMENT THAT BECOMES A STRAITJACKET IN A CRISIS
As the health crisis has shown, the EU is capable of finding willpower when events require. A very formal document , especially if it assumes a minimal capability for action, could prove counterproductive in a crisis. This reasoning applies to relations with NATO, which the compass should not make too rigid. Similarly, less flexibility in our relations with Russia, Turkey, China and certain North African countries could be damaging. Updating the Strategic Compass every five years would allow us to adjust it to the geostrategic reality while limiting all the risks stated above.
E. THE ADDITIONAL RISK OF FRANCE BEING SEEN AS IN CONTROL
France , perhaps worried that a disappointing Strategic Compass may tarnish its presidency of the Council of the EU, should take care to avoid indulging its penchant for spectacular statements and promoting concepts. If it does so, it would only upset its partners and undermine the process.
Nevertheless, France is still respected, and its assessments are eagerly awaited: it will therefore have to stand by its convictions, explain them and try to convince other countries, in the interest of all EU countries .
* 1 Senate report no. 626 (2018-2019), July 2019.
* 2 Operational Headquarters : another way of referring to an operational planning staff (to conduct, plan and organise military missions). An MPCC in the role of OHQ would be placed between the EUMS, which deals with concepts at the European level, and the military staff that commands the operation on the ground