FOREWORD
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“Truly a day will come when you will have to face the foe.”
Herodotus, Histories, VII, 141
European defence is like the proverbial glass: some say the glass is half empty; others say it is half full. The work conducted by your rapporteurs these past six months has inevitably brought them to the side of the optimists, those who see the glass half-full and filling. Faced with the erosion of multilateralism and the increasingly uninhibited attitudes of the great powers, Europe is in a difficult position in terms of its defence. And yet, at no time since the Second World War has it held such a good hand.
With the notable exceptions of France and the United Kingdom, each of which ultimately developed nuclear weapons, Europe gave up on providing for its own defence in the second half of the twentieth century. This was due on the one hand to the political, material and moral weakening caused by the two World Wars, and on the other to the fact that starting in 1945, the continent became a space that was disputed between the United States and the USSR in the Cold War.
In spite of this very specific context, the question of Europe's security has remained central. In particular, it was one of the reasons behind European integration, born out of the resolve of the six founding countries to make any new war between them impossible. This goal has been brilliantly achieved. Other threats have emerged or become stronger, however. The question of European defence is thus hardly a new one. It has been and will remain an objective for the future, shared among the peoples of Europe, whether their governments make it a priority or not. From this perspective, it is likely that in the future when we look back on history we will see the end of this decade as a turning point in the process of European construction.
More than any other, the defence field is characterised by its ties with national sovereignty, thus making it deeply political, but this political nature is not shaped by the domestic agendas of the leaders of the European countries: it is above all the result of geopolitical pressures, pressures over which those who govern our democracies for a limited period of time have little control.
As your rapporteurs conducted their work over these six months, the ambivalence of the pressures weighing upon Europe have appeared clearly to them: on the one hand, Europe finds itself facing its responsibilities as the non- European powers become increasingly uninhibited in their actions; on the other, the difficulty of the situation requires it ever more urgently to rouse itself from its inaction as a geopolitical entity. Otherwise, it will soon fall into a kind of vassalage, which, informed by the work they have now completed, your rapporteurs do not believe to be really accepted in any of the European countries.
The spotlight constantly cast upon the tensions and divergences between the European governments obscures the significant collective convergence of ideas amongst Europeans on some fundamental issues. It also fails to take into consideration both the shared destiny that unites us and the awareness of that shared destiny among the various European peoples.
The subject of European defence has been the focus of many reports, conferences, and a variety of studies, many of which are of very high quality. The aim of this report is not to provide a synthesis of these works, but to situate the French perspective in the wider European context, which, while it is very well known and has been abundantly described by specialists on the issue, has been largely ignored in our domestic debates. It would certainly be an unusual approach to simply assert a vision of European defence without looking into what our European partners might think. Yet this is precisely what we have been doing for quite some time now. It might have been understandable back in the 1960s, when France was seeking to set itself apart from its partners, but today, how can we think of building European defence without listening to and trying to understand the points of view of other European countries?
In this respect, the situation is very clear. For all of our European partners, and most French specialists as well, it is an obvious fact that the defence of Europe today is provided essentially by NATO, which is to say, in more concrete terms, by the United States of America. 2 ( * ) Nevertheless, France has expressed its vision in a way that has sometimes led our partners to perceive it as harbouring a desire to disengage from the United States. Clearly, the fact that our position is perceived in this way casts confusion over what we are saying about the necessity of strategic autonomy for Europe. The difficulty we have had in hearing and understanding our partners' points of view has weakened the credibility of our proposals and, to put it simply, harmed our interests.
France is right in asserting that in the face of rising threats, Europe will need to be able to defend itself, protect its interests, and protect its citizens. But all the other European countries are also right to observe that in the short term, Europe is unable to defend itself without the help of the United States. Denying this obvious state of affairs, as we sometimes appear to be doing when we suddenly introduce certain poorly-defined concepts into the debate, inspires incomprehension or even concern among our partners. In the discussions your rapporteurs have held with their foreign contacts, however, the convergences largely outweigh the differences. We are therefore often wasting precious time and energy attempting to explain, justify and defend our positions, when these positions ultimately are not unacceptable to our partners.
This report aims to show how, through a host of initiatives of all kinds (political, institutional, industrial, operational, etc.), the European countries have now entered a new phase, which is possible only because there is in fact a rising global awareness that the international context has changed.
The first major element of this change is the growing tension between the United States and China. Seeing China as its main strategic competitor, and Southeast Asia as its main focus, the United States has made it quite clear that Europe, in contrast, is not its strategic priority. As was emphasised several times in the hearings conducted by your rapporteurs, this new course predates the election of Donald Trump as the President of the USA. Rather, it was Barack Obama who was the first to define this “strategic pivot”, and while this vision may have been expressed more vigorously under President Trump, the fact is that two successive presidents from two different political parties have now shared it, which obliges us to consider it as a permanent change. Even our European partners who are most committed to the transatlantic bond are aware of this, but they also point out that Europe is unable to defend itself without the United States for the time being, and thus conclude that it is essential to avoid doing anything that might weaken that American protection.
The second element in this context is the interventionist attitude of Russia. This was initiated with the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 and has inched closer to European territory with the intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. But the renewed use of Russian force also manifested itself in Syria, where Russia rescued the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which was about to be overthrown. This new posture has now been displayed around all the borders of Europe through an air and naval presence that is akin to a constant show of force. Added to this have been its disinformation, cyber-attack and espionage activities, whether for intelligence purposes or for violent ends, such as the murder attempt on dissident Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom. This conduct on Russia's part has reinforced the conviction of many European countries that the threat on Europe's Eastern flank makes a continued American presence essential. These same countries consider that the primary strategic objective of Russia is to detach the United States from the European continent so that it can then have free rein. This prospect explains the concerns felt in these countries when there are episodes of tension between Europeans and Americans.
The third contextual element is the development of threats on the Southern front. These are of two kinds. On the one hand, European countries have in recent years experienced a series of unprecedented jihadist terrorist attacks. On the other, the civil war in Iraq and Syria, aggravated by the emergence of the caliphate of the Islamic State (IS), has generated a considerable flow of migrants towards Europe. Likewise, the collapse of the Libyan State following the Western intervention there has facilitated the establishment of criminal networks focused on Europe, profiting in particular from human trafficking and the exploitation of migrants trying to enter Europe. Finally, the weakening of the States in the Sahel-Saharan Strip (SSS) has made that area a base for jihadist networks and organised crime, with the two sometimes overlapping.
However, if the terror attacks that have hit France since 2015 have taught us anything, it is that the situation in the Near and Middle East and in Africa has direct consequences for the security of European countries. The idea of ??a “Fortress Europe” to which the European countries might retreat while remaining indifferent to the violence impacting the neighbouring countries is completely illusory. From this perspective, then, the issue of European defence is not a matter for long-term theoretical political debate; it is a matter of practical inquiry, and one that is quite likely to have a concrete impact.
European countries face significant challenges. The hardships they have overcome in the past have given them the strength to defend our freedom, our values ?and our way of life. Your rapporteurs are convinced that the political will exists to take action both together and with our allies, but in order to do so, we must listen to what our European partners are saying:
“Your own eyes might convince you of the truth,
If but for one moment you could look at me.” 3 ( * )
* 2 Given their nuclear capacities, France and the United Kingdom are the only countries able to implement a deterrence strategy of their own to protect their vital interests.
* 3 Phaedra, II, 5.