CHAPTER VI - FRANCE AND EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
I. FRANCE'S FOREIGN POLICY
France's postwar foreign policy has had three priorities: the construction of Europe, alliance with the United States and evolution of the Middle East, which has ceaselessly captured French diplomats' attention because the country has such a wide range of important interests in that part of the world.
France, like the West as a whole, must address the Arab-Israeli conflict in its relations with all the Middle East countries except Iran. France's attitude towards the conflict may shape its image in the Arab world and influence its relations with all the region's countries, but it also has other interests and pursues other objectives. Aside from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is a good idea to distinguish between three geographical areas, each with its own set of issues: Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, where France has an old presence; Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries (the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain); Iran and Iraq, which have Shiite majorities.
A. THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
During the Fourth Republic France broke with its "Arab policy" dating to Bonaparte's Egypt expedition and decided to back Israel, even becoming the Jewish State's main arms supplier and helping it acquire nuclear weapons.
General de Gaulle changed course after becoming president in 1958. After Israel won the Six Day War in June 1967 the French government said that "no fait accompli " would be accepted as final, ending the period of close ties between Paris and Tel Aviv. On November 22, 1967 France voted for Security Council resolution 242, which established the right of all the region's States to exist, including Israel, but summoned Israel to pull out of the occupied territories. At a press conference on November 27, 1967, President de Gaulle criticized Jews as "an elitist, swaggering and domineering people". He justified the shift in French policy by saying it was a return to its historic roots and announced that closer ties with the Arabs "must be one of the fundamental bases of our foreign policy today" .
Every president has followed the Gaullist pro-Arab line since then.
Under Valéry Giscard d'Estaing France voted for the PLO's admission to United Nations, sparking an outcry in Israel. In 1975 he let the PLO open an office in Paris. Five years later he pressured his European partners into accepting the Venice Declaration, which proclaimed the Palestinian people's right to self-determination for the first time.
François Mitterrand, who thought Giscard's policy was too pro-Arab, set out to revive Franco-Israeli relations during his first term. He was the first French president to visit Israel and address the Knesset, on March 4, 1982, but quickly returned to the traditional line after June 6, 1982 when, while hosting the G7 in Versailles, Israel invaded Lebanon, roughing up the UNIFIL on the way. France condemned the invasion and helped evacuate Palestinians from besieged Beirut. France, the United States and Italy set up the Multinational Interposition Force (MIF), which helped move 15,000 Palestinian fighters to northern Lebanon. It was after the MIF left that Lebanese Christian militias massacred Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in September 1982.
The Lebanese pitfall, with its hostages and terrorists attacks, some of which even occurred on French soil, combined with the Gulf War, prompted Mitterrand to disengage from the Middle East and temporarily end the Arab policy. Foreign minister Roland Dumas blamed the Arabs. "Evoking the Arab world is one myth," he said. "An Arab policy is another." 61 ( * )
When Jacques Chirac became president in May 1995 he shifted France's Middle East policy back to its traditional line. In an August 1996 speech at Cairo's Al Hassam University he said, "France's Arab policy must be an essential dimension of its foreign policy. I want to give it a new thrust in line with the course set by the man who initiated it, General de Gaulle..."
The principles Chirac spelled out in Cairo--non-interference by the great powers, affirmation of the independence of peoples and use of regional bodies--had two goals: moving the Arab-Israeli peace process forward and establishing a Euro-Mediterranean partnership, which led to the Barcelona process .
A rash of anti-Semitic acts in France starting in 2000, when the second Intifada broke out, undermined Chirac's position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Sharon's government harshly criticized France, even accusing the French of anti-Semitism. In 2003 Chirac felt obliged to visit the United States to meet the major American Jewish organizations. He also appointed a roving ambassador "in charge of the international dimension of the Shoah, despoliations and the duty to remember" as well as a new French ambassador to Israel.
But it was not much use. Since the 1960s the Arab capitals and the Palestinians have expected a solution to their conflict with Israel to come from Washington, not Paris or Brussels. To the bitter end France continued to recognize Yasser Arafat as the Palestinians' representative and its diplomats visited him in his Muqata'a residence in Israeli-besieged Ramallah. It even offered him medical treatment in his final days. None of that mattered: the Palestinians expected the United States, not France, to break the deadlock, which illustrates the limits of diplomacy based on emotions and personal relationships.
Heeding the lessons of his predecessor's successes and failures, President Nicolas Sarkozy sought more balance in Israel's favor in order to become an honest broker. He wanted French diplomacy to play a bigger role and have a wider audience.
The shift was based on the observation that, although France is well-liked, the country was not considered a possible peacemaker because it did not have Israel's ear. Sarkozy therefore sought closer ties with the Jewish State, becoming the second French president to address the Knesset, in June 2008, when he delivered a balanced speech recalling the constants of French policy. "I have come to tell you that the French people will always stand by the State of Israel's side when its existence is threatened," he said. "We owe our friends the truth; otherwise we are not friends. The truth is that Israel's security, on which France will never compromise, will never be truly assured until we see an independent, modern, democratic and viable Palestinian State by its side."
Foreign affairs minister Bernard Kouchner played an active part in this policy of closer ties. The Gaza tragedy in late 2008 revealed the brutality of the Israeli army and the cynicism of its leaders. The elections in Israel brought to power a prime minister who refused to recognize the Palestinians' right to a State. Since then, and despite professions of friendship, French policy towards Israel has hesitated.
B. FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY IN LEBANON, SYRIA AND EGYPT
France's historic, emotional ties to Lebanon are old, important and well known.
In the 1990s France found itself "trapped" in Lebanon, which had become a bone of contention between Israel, supported by the United States, Syria, backed by the USSR, and Iran, which instrumentalized the Amal militia before throwing its weight behind Hezbollah. France's position in favor of Lebanon's independence led to an unprecedented wave of attacks, including the assassination of ambassador Louis Delamare in Beirut on September 4, 1981 by Lebanese from the Shiite party Amal, probably on Teheran's instructions; the rue des Rosiers attack on August 9, 1982; and the suicide attack on the Drakkar building in Beirut that took the lives of 58 French soldiers (241 US soldiers were killed the same day).
François Mitterrand, aware that France faced hostility from Syria on because of Lebanon, Iran because of its support for Iraq, and Libya because of its Chad policy, not to mention the tension that continuously beset its relations with Israel, opted for a disengagement from Lebanon in particular and the Middle East in general. France played only a limited role in drafting the 1990 Taif accords, which ended the Lebanon war and consecrated the legitimacy of Syria's control over that country.
Under Jacques Chirac's presidency, France froze its diplomatic relations with Syria after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
Today French relations with Lebanon are excellent. France perseveres in its attachment to international legality and to the Lebanese State, which alone possesses the legitimate power to use force. But it has also taken note of the importance of Hezbollah, which has become a fixture on Lebanon's political landscape while at the same time developing its military capacities.
France has had strong ties with Syria since 1946, but the dialogue was often strained owing to the two countries' positions on Lebanon. That was particularly the case in 2004 and even more so in 2005 with Rafik Hariri's assassination, which Syria's leaders are suspected of having masterminded.
President Sarkozy decided to revive the dialogue, which nearly damaged France's relations with Saudi Arabia. When President Bashir el-Assad attended the Bastille Day parade on July 14, 2008, and President Sarkozy visited Damascus, it helped end Syria's diplomatic isolation.
Today it looks as though Sarkozy's bold strategy has paid off, as the appointment of a United States ambassador to Damascus and the resumption of dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Syria attest.
France's relations with Egypt are less passionate than with Lebanon or Syria, but cultural, scientific and technical cooperation, which mainly focuses on promoting French and training elites, date back a long time and is qualitatively significant. In addition to hosting several thousand students in France, Franco-Egyptian cooperation is based on a French presence in Egypt's greatest universities and on the Université française d'Egypte.
Egyptian diplomacy's active involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, combined with a broad convergence of views between French and Egyptian leaders, make Cairo an ally and partner in the region.
C. FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA AND THE GULF
France did not start developing a presence on the Arabian Peninsula until the presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who visited the Gulf countries in 1980. Those States are new: Kuwait was created in 1961, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman in 1971.
President Chirac, whose policy was marked by a strong personal relationship with Saudi Arabia's King Abdallah, continued in that direction.
Since 1996 France and Saudi Arabia have had a "strategic partnership". Dialogue is often based on a convergence of views, flowering trade and scientific and technical development cooperation. France sells more arms to Saudi Arabia than it does to any other country and is its third-leading weapons supplier.
France's special relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is based on the "global strategic partnership" President Chirac initiated in 1997, which includes a defense accord and extensive cultural cooperation illustrated by the "Louvre Abu Dhabi" project. Trade is thriving, making the UAE France's main partner in the Gulf. The recent construction of Abu Dhabi's naval base and the concession of army and air force bases strengthen the relationship. France also has excellent ties with Bahrain and Qatar, as the "Saint Cyr-Qatar" military academy project attests. However, bilateral relations with Kuwait are not as good as they should be, despite official visits, diplomatic efforts and the conclusion of scientific and technical cooperation accords in higher education (Institut Français du pétrole, HEC, IEP, etc.).
D. FRANCE'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAN AND IRAQ
The history of Franco-Iraqi relations started with the Aref brothers, Iraq's presidents in the 1960s, and not, as is commonly believed, with Saddam Hussein's and Jacques Chirac's mutual declarations of friendship in 1974. That is when France developed an overtly pro-Iraqi policy, building the "Osiraq" nuclear research reactor and selling Baghdad Mirage F1 jets. President Mitterrand pursued the policy. Like all the Western States, France backed Iraq when it attacked Iran in 1980. Three years later France even loaned Iraq five Super-Étendard planes armed with Exocet missiles that hit the Kharg oil terminal.
In August 1990 France sharply condemned the invasion of Kuwait and actively participated in the anti-Iraqi coalition forces during the Gulf War, which led to the two countries' breaking diplomatic relations.
In reality, France's policy was always favorable to Iraq, which, in the eyes of Paris 62 ( * ) , looked secular and republican. In 1995 Paris managed to have a UN resolution passed allowing Iraq to sell a limited amount of oil to buy food and medicine. Three years later the country played an important part in the crisis over UN inspectors' access to sites that may have housed prohibited weapons. The whole world remembers France's efforts to prevent the Iraq War, which was started without United Nations approval.
In May 2003 Paris voted for resolution 1483 ending 13 years of sanctions and giving US-UK forces control of Iraq's economy and political future. In July 2004 diplomatic relations were restored at the ambassador level.
In December 2005 France signed an accord to forgive four billion euros of Iraq's debt. In August 2007 Bernard Kouchner became the first Western foreign affairs minister to Iraq, which he did again in May 2008, followed in February 2009 by President Sarkozy, who announced that French companies would soon be back. French cooperation has become steadier and more diversified: training elites, supporting and preserving Iraqi culture, humanitarian aid, etc. The opening of a French embassy office in Erbil will complete France's diplomatic representation in Iraq.
France's relations with Iran have been more chaotic.
Before the Islamic Revolution France had good relations with the Shah's regime. In 1975 Iran asked Framatome to build five nuclear power plants and acquired a stake in Eurodif, a company created to produce enriched uranium. But the contract's revocation by the Bakhtiar government in 1979 and the advent of the Islamic Republic jeopardized Franco-Iranian relations.
Despite the Iranians' warm feelings towards France for having welcomed Ayatollah Khomeiny and the Pahlavi regime's opponents, the new government did not give it any privileges. After the Revolution successive waves of refugees arrived in France, straining relations between the two countries. Former prime minister Shapour Bakhtiar was the first refugee whose extradition the Islamic Republic requested. Iranian secret services tried to assassinate him in 1980 and succeeded in 1991.
In 1981 relations between the Socialist government and the Iranian theocracy were strained. The next year President Mitterrand refused to apply the Eurodif accord and to supply Iran with uranium. In retaliation Teheran demanded the repayment of a billion-dollar loan from the Shah. Iranian opposition leaders, particularly the People's Muhajedeen and Bani Sadr, started taking refuge in France in 1981.
France backed Iraq during its war with Iran, triggering a violent reaction from Teheran, including hostage-taking in Lebanon and terrorist attacks on French soil. In 1987 France took action to counter terrorists and broke off diplomatic relations until 1988.
After the Gulf War the European Community countries, especially France, sought to adopt a policy that would be more independent of the United States. France objected to the 1996 D'Amato-Kennedy Act, which aimed to sanction companies trading with "rogue States", including Iran, with which Total had concluded a drilling contract the previous year.
The European countries tried to restore dialogue with Iran when Mohammad Khatami became president. In August 1998 French foreign minister Hubert Védrine went to Teheran and formally invited Khatami to France, but the visit never took place.
Today the European Union accounts for over half of Iran's foreign trade but France's share is negligible compared to Germany's. In 2003 France and Iran signed an accord protecting and promoting investments.
The current crisis over Iran's nuclear program could seriously damage economic ties between Europe and Iran.
* 61 Roland Dumas, Le Monde, March 12, 1991.
* 62 See Jean-Pierre Chevènement: Le vert et le noir - Paris Grasset 1995